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This thesis examines the political culture and behavior in South Carolina during 
the secession crisis and first two years of the Civil War. Historians have an lyzed 
antebellum politics in South Carolina but few recent attempts have been made to trac
those issues to the larger narrative of state politics during the Civil War. I argue that 
serious political divisions existed in the Palmetto State during the sectional crisis over 
the proper method and procedure of secession. Once secession became a reality South 
Carolina politicians attempted to bury these differences for the sake of unity, but 
ultimately the pressures of war caused them to appear once again, thereby jeopardizing 
the harmony and unity that so many politicians in the state hoped for. Secession itself 
was an external revolution. Yet, another revolution occurred within the state as the war 
progressed. This internal revolution took the form of an Executive Council that 
essentially removed the governor of South Carolina from power. The entire experiment 
represented a decisive departure from the state’s long political tradition and culture.  
This study demonstrates that little agreement existed in South Carolina on the 
nature of the external revolution. The establishment of a southern confederacy was 
clearly the desired end, but the means to achieve this end differed widely in the state. 
More fundamentally, little unanimity existed on the nature of the proposed southern 
nation. South Carolina politicians could not come to an ideological agreement on what 
this revolution was about. Not only was South Carolina the only state in the 
Confederacy to seriously debate the merits of the Confederate Constitution, but it was 
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the only state whose secession convention was still in existence two years aftr leaving 
the Union.  
The result was a lengthy and bitter dispute over the sovereign powers of the 
convention. Because the actions of the Executive Council were extraordinary, they 
created an internal revolution within the state. This revolution moved in a direction that 
nobody quite anticipated. The constitutional functioning of state government was 
temporarily suspended to meet the exigencies of war. Since the council was a cre ture of 
the convention, many came to question the legitimacy of both the council and 
convention. Eventually the people of South Carolina reacted against them so that the 
state might return to “constitutional government.”  
 Yet, for all the division and disagreement that existed, the Executive Council is 
not an indication of fleeting morale, willpower, or general disillusionment with the war. 
Instead, it is an expression of Confederate nationalism. The story of the convention and 
council indicate that South Carolinians were willing to temporarily sacrifice many of 
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Confederate politics has certainly not been neglected by historians. Legislation 
coming out of the Confederate Congress, its relationship to President Davis, what those 
relationships say about Confederate nationalism, morale, and willpower, has been 
analyzed in detail by scholars who study the American Civil War. Unfortunately, the 
political history of South Carolina during the Civil War has received inadequate attention 
in recent years. In 1950 Charles Cauthen wrote an excellent book on this very subject and 
it remains the most comprehensive study to this day. But the state that inaugurated 
secession and proposed the creation of a southern confederacy deserves a re-evaluation in 
light of the studies that have appeared since that time. Several excellent monographs exist 
that deal with the nature of antebellum South Carolina politics but few attempts have 
been made to connect those issues to the larger story of the Civil War.  
This study attempts to bridge that gap. It argues that serious political divisions 
were created from the sectional crisis that developed in the state over the proper method 
and procedure of secession. The roots of secession in South Carolina were firmly in place
by 1860. Yet, the political disparity over how and when to bring about secession created 
lasting factions that did not die once South Carolina made its bid for independence. 
Palmetto State politicians attempted to bury these differences for the sake of unity but 
ultimately the pressures of war caused these divisions to re-emerge and crte  an 
internal revolution within the state that nobody quite anticipated. The end result was a 
political experiment that constituted a decisive departure from South Carolina’s 
antebellum political tradition and culture.  
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Lengthy debates ensued in the legislature and state convention over fundamental 
questions involving the nature of the proposed Confederacy. South Carolina’s delegation 
to the Montgomery convention was hopelessly divided over what kind of government 
should be created. Robert Barnwell Rhett had a fixed vision of a southern confederacy 
that never came to be. Other members of the South Carolina delegation wanted 
provisions included in the Permanent Constitution that were soundly rejected by the other 
southern states. Nearly all of the resolutions offered by South Carolina were defeate  at 
the Montgomery convention. When ratification of the Permanent Constitution was 
debated in the state convention another bitter debate ensued between the cooperationists 
and radicals. No other state in the Confederacy debated the merits of the Confederate 
Constitution as extensively as South Carolina. The radicals seemed determined to push 
ahead with the revolution they had done so much to create. The moderates, in turn, tried 
to stop the revolution from spinning out of control. The revolution did go on, but in 1862 
it moved in a direction that did not entirely please either faction. The internal revolution 
that occurred in South Carolina during the second year of the war threatened to unravel 
and expose serious divisions all politicians hoped to eliminate for the sake of victoryand 
independence.  
Nevertheless, this disagreement should not be interpreted as a rejection of the 
Confederacy. On the contrary, South Carolina gave the Confederacy its unrelentig 
support during the first two years of the war. In fact, even before the Confederate 
Congress passed Conscription Acts and threatened the central tenet of states’ rights, 
South Carolina had already embarked on a extensive program of state centralization that 
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impinged on the individualism and local autonomy that South Carolinians had held so 
dear during the antebellum era.  
The leadership of Governor Francis Pickens in 1861, or perhaps more accurately, 
the lack of leadership, resulted in South Carolina experimenting with politics that were 
unknown in the antebellum period. Pickens controlled the state and made the military 
decisions in 1861.  His failure to secure the South Carolina from federal assaults on the 
coast resulted in a silent coup that essentially removed him from power. After the fall of 
Port Royal in November and the Great Fire of Charleston in December 1861, the state 
convention was reassembled at the request of President David F. Jamison and it 
proceeded to create an Executive Council that usurped the powers of both the governor 
and legislature. Throughout 1862 South Carolina had a dual government: a governor and 
legislature elected under the constitution of 1790 and an Executive Council elected by th  
Convention of the People. The council functioned as an arm of the convention and 
assumed both an executive and legislative role. The legislature, technically st ll the legal 
law-making body under the constitution, was temporarily relegated to a position of 
unimportance. Governor Pickens was essentially replaced as Commander-in-Chief by 
James Chesnut Jr., who became Chief of the Department of the Military, and the 
Executive Council exercised extraordinary powers that were granted by the convention to 
take charge of state affairs and put South Carolina on a more permanent war-footing. The 
legislature, which had adjourned in December 1861, did not meet again until December 
of 1862. When it did meet, the legislature promptly repealed all measures taken by the 
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council and disbanded that body so that the state might return to “Constitutional 
Government.”  
The measures taken by the Executive Council were nothing short of 
revolutionary. Manufacturing was increased to proportions unknown in the antebellum 
days. Relief was provided to displaced citizens and provisions made to ease the suffering 
of the poor. That state politics was fundamentally altered by the council can hardly be 
doubted. By all indications the council not only went about its work with considerable 
energy but also produced tangible results. In a very real sense the Executive Co ncil was 
an expression of Confederate nationalism. But the council also aroused fierce resntment 
over what many considered to be arbitrary measures and abuses of power. Charges were 
made that the council was legislating and acting as an executive body at the s me time, 
which, of course, was true. This breech of the separation of powers stirred an opposition 
movement that eventually resulted in the dissolution of the convention and council. In 
other words, proper constitutional procedure was still important to South Carolinians.   
Although the lines of factionalism in the antebellum era were not as clear cut on 
this issue over the Executive Council, one can detect lingering discontent that was 
reminiscent of earlier days. It was said that the council was created out of necessity, that 
the exigencies of war required a stronger executive department, and yet, the ntire 
episode illustrates the limits as to how far the people were willing to go to secure victory. 
Contradictions abounded and the process of resolving the paradoxical nature of state 
politics during a time of war was not easy. Sharp disagreement over the powersand 
sovereignty of the convention mirrored the differences of an earlier time. 
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 In the end, the council’s downfall came about because a majority of South 
Carolinians were unwilling to forfeit all the basic tenets that were fundamental to the 
constitutional functioning of state government. They were willing to make sacrifices but 
they could not continue them indefinitely. Although the Confederacy never developed 
anything resembling political parties, the Executive Council of 1862 is a fine illustration 
of how factionalism came to take the place of parties.  There were radicals and moderates 
who supported the council just as there were radicals and moderates who opposed it. It 
cannot be said that the council was the creation of any particular faction but it does 
demonstrate there were definite limitations on the departure of past political pra tice 
these groups would allow. South Carolinians were willing to accept temporary changes to 
its state government for the sake of victory. The creation of the Executive Council was a 
product of the war. There can be little doubt that the council was created because South 
Carolina politicians were uncertain of victory. The war was not unfolding in a way that 
most South Carolinians imagined it would. Military necessity became the watch ord of 
the day and the council was justified under this ground. Yet, the state’s long political 
tradition could not simply be swept away. The tensions and debates stemming from these 
political questions created an internal atmosphere that all of South Carolina politicians 






Prelude to Secession: The Sectional Crisis in South Carolina 
 Southern nationalism came early to South Carolina. There is something to be said 
for placing its origins during the Nullification crisis when antidemocratic and proslavery 
discourse began to form the theoretical foundation of southern nationalism.1 To be sure, 
Nullification was a divisive episode that did much to exacerbate the political and social 
gulf between planter and yeoman. Planters too became divided among themselves over 
basic assumptions about the exercise of political power and the proper relation between 
the state and federal government. Ideological and theoretical questions regarding the 
sovereignty of state conventions appeared during this time and there was no little 
disagreement on the question of how much power a state convention possessed. Was a 
state convention limited in its sovereignty? How long could a convention be in session? 
Could a convention legislate? Was a convention “the people” acting in their highest 
sovereign capacity, or was a convention merely a representative body called for a specific 
purpose and limited in its power by the state constitution? Not surprisingly, these difficult 
and complex questions were not answered definitively by South Carolina politicians. 
Over thirty years later in 1862, when South Carolina was in the midst of a civil war, these 
questions would again come to the surface and produce a bitter debate that threatened to 
tear apart the political fabric of the state.  
 Paradoxically, for all the divisiveness that Nullification produced it also 
crystallized South Carolina planter politicians’ commitment to slavery and southern 
                                                
1 Manisha Sinha, The Counter Revolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina 
(Chapel Hill, NC.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 33. 
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nationalism. The failure of those who advocated unionism helped to prevent a viable 
political opposition to the proslavery and separatist discourse championed by the 
nullifiers. Democratic reform and political dissent was checked as the South Carolina 
state government retained a largely undemocratic structure.2 In antebellum South 
Carolina, the legislature was the keystone of the state’s political system. The legislature, 
not “the people,” elected the governor, presidential electors, United States enators, and a 
plethora of important local officers. This system gave disproportionate power to the 
legislature and ran against the grain of Jacksonian democracy and acted as a barrier to the 
creation of a two-party system in the state. It was not that Jacksonian democracy 
completely bypassed South Carolina but its form took a different shape. As Lacy Ford 
explains, there were “important idiosyncrasies, differences which placed South Carolina 
defiantly out of the national Jacksonian mainstream.…South Carolina had all the energy 
of grassroots democracy but none of the chains of the Jacksonian party system, a 
combination which proved to be a fine prescription for radicalism.”3 
This prescription proved useful to South Carolina planter politicians as sectional 
tensions began to deepen over the country’s Manifest Destiny. On August 8, 1846, 
Pennsylvania Democrat David Wilmot offered an amendment to an appropriations bill 
stipulating that any territory acquired by the United States from Mexico as a result of 
peace negotiations be required to prohibit the institution of slavery.  The Wilmot Proviso 
became a central issue in national politics because it fueled the sectional debate not only 
                                                
2 Sinha, Counter Revolution of Slavery, 60-61; for an alternative view that argues antebellum South 
Carolina was fiercely democratic at the grassroots level, see Lacy K. Ford Jr., Origins of Southern 
Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry 1800-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).  
3 Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 143-44. 
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over slavery in the territories, but also over slavery where it already existed. Reaction in 
the Palmetto state was swift and immediate. Throughout 1847-1848 mass meetings and 
public rallies were held across the state denouncing the Wilmot Proviso as “a gr tuitous 
insult to the South.”  Even the lifelong Unionist and South Carolina moderate Benjamin 
F. Perry drafted a set of resolutions at a public meeting in Greenville vowing to resist the 
proviso “at all hazards and to the last extremity.”  He went on to warn that adoption of 
the proviso would create “alarming and imminent peril” which would hang over “the 
institutions and sovereign rights of the slaveholding states.”4  Public gatherings and 
private correspondence indicate the almost complete unanimity on the reaction to 
Wilmot’s amendment.5 Fear and suspicion soon gripped the state and by May 1849 
twenty-nine local committees had gathered in Columbia to establish a Central Committee 
of Vigilance and Safety which acted as a quasi-official advisory body to thegovernor. By 
early summer almost every district in the state had endorsed resolutions pledging to resist 
any further attacks on the institution of slavery.6 
The ferocity of South Carolina’s defense of slavery and opposition to the Wilmot 
Proviso can be traced to the political thinking of John C. Calhoun, who had by this time 
fully developed the doctrine that slavery could not be excluded from a territory prior to 
its admission to statehood. This theory took shape in a set of resolutions Calhoun 
introduced in the Senate on February 19, 1847. In its essentials, Calhoun argued that the 
                                                
4 Lillian Adele Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry: South Carolina Unionist (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 
1946), 240. 
5 Lacy K. Ford Jr., Origins of Southern Radicalism, 186; David Duncan Wallace, The History of South 
Carolina (New York: The American Historical Society, 1934), Vol. III, 118; Walter Edgar, South 
Carolina: A History (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 341. 
6 Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 187-88. 
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territories were the common property of the states, and therefore, citizens of a y given 
state had the same constitutional rights to take their property into the common territ ries. 
Any discrimination against the property rights of the citizens of various states would be a 
violation of the Constitution.7  Often referred to as the “Calhoun Doctrine,” South 
Carolinians fanatically defended this political theory which would become the basis for 
the southern political platform throughout the sectional crisis.8 
If the Nullification episode provided the origins for a nascent southern 
nationalism, the territorial crisis of 1846-1850 solidified the conception. Although South 
Carolina had never developed a strong two-party system in the antebellum era, it was 
during these critical years, particularly the election of 1848, when South Carolina 
politicians began to disassociate their state from national political parties more than ever 
before.9 Manisha Sinha has persuasively argued that the discourse of southern 
nationalism was firmly grounded in the defense of racial slavery. Formal constitutional 
and political arguments were of secondary importance compared to “the vindication of 
slavery as a superior way of ordering society and of a separate identity based on lavery,” 
which would “constitute the discourse of southern nationalism.” It was the desireto 
expand slavery into the territories which augmented the idea of southern nationalism. For 
Sinha, the desire stemmed from a strong belief among southern leaders in the proslav ry 
argument, while the discourse of proslavery politics “provided the ideological coherence 
                                                
7 David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 59-60. 
8 Sinha, The Counter Revolution of Slavery, 70-71. 
9 N.W. Stephenson, “Southern Nationalism in South Carolina in 1851,” The American Historical Review, 
36, 2, (Jan., 1931), 314-35. 
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and unity to southern nationalism.”10 Sinha’s view carries a considerable degree of 
credibility. However, Emory Thomas reminds us that “nationalism is a compound of 
many interdependent elements. In the Old South a unique social economy combined with 
a distinctive “mind,” religious spirit, life style, and culture to produce a nascent 
nationalism.”11 In other words, southern nationalism was a nebulous conception 
composed of many different elements all revolving around a loosely defined “southern 
way of life.” Thomas’s idea that the “cause” began as a deeply rooted ideology which 
provided the theoretical basis for a southern nation is more pertinent to this study. In 
South Carolina, ideology shaped government more than anything else. The southern 
nationalism that developed early in South Carolina can be partly explained as a reaction 
to the attacks on slavery from outside the state. 
After the Wilmot Proviso was introduced, South Carolina politicians split into two 
factions and were in serious disagreement over the best strategies and tactics to defend 
slavery and southern society.  One group of conservative politicians tended to be more 
nationally orientated, complaining that Calhoun was keeping South Carolina out of the 
national mainstream. This group consisted primarily of old Unionists such as Benjamin F. 
Perry and James L. Petigru and moderate politicians like James L. Orr who believed that 
slavery could be best defended through existing party ties. The other group was far more 
radical, consisting of ambitious men such as Robert Barnwell Rhett and Laurence M. 
Keitt who urged more aggressive and audacious defiance of the federal government. The 
radical faction had little qualms about taking South Carolina out of the Union if need be. 
                                                
10 Sinha, Counter Revolution of Slavery, 63-64.  
11 Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 (New York, Harper & Row, 1979), 28. 
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Calhoun was caught in the middle and criticized by both factions. Yet, it was Calhoun 
who held the political center together, and as long as Calhoun remained alive he could 
keep the opposing forces in check. Once Calhoun died (March 31, 1850) however, all the 
issues surrounding the Compromise of 1850 generated an internal debate in state politics 
that almost took South Carolina out of the Union. South Carolina entered the most critical 
decade of the sectional crisis “in a state of political turmoil and without the constraint of 
party fetters to help calm her.” The result was the first secession crisis which produced 
“the most vigorous and divisive political campaigns since the nullification crisisand 
revealed how even strategic and tactical disagreements over Southern rights could nearly 
tear the state apart.”12 
The Nashville Convention and the first secession crisis in South Carolina have 
been described in detail by others.13 While the factional debates and political alignments 
that ensued in the legislature over the crisis are fascinating, it is inexpedint to fully trace 
their development here. It suffices to say the legislature passed an act to call a state 
convention “with the view and intention of arresting further aggressions, and if possible 
of restoring the Constitutional rights of the South.” If these rights were not restored, said 
the legislature, the bill would provide “due provision for their future safety and 
independence.”14 It seemed that the radicals were having their way and bringing the state 
ever closer to disunion. However, serious disagreements over how best to provide “future 
                                                
12 Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 183-84, quote at 184. 
13 For an older but still excellent study on this movement, see Philip M. Hamer, The Secession Movement in 
South Carolina 1847-1852 (Allentown, PA.: H. Ray Haas & Co., 1918). 
14 Acts of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, passed in December, 1850 (Columbia, SC.: 
From the Steam-Power Press of I.C. Morgan, State Printer, 1850), 55-57. 
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safety and independence” quickly surfaced. There soon developed two competing 
factions between “separate state actionists” and “cooperationists.”  
This factional split is important because the radicals, or “fire-eaters,” created the 
atmosphere of secession, generated excitement over it, and provided the framework of 
debate. Rhett, for example, told delegates at the Nashville Convention (June 1850) that a 
slave society “must rule themselves or perish.” He was already convinced that there was 
only “one course left, for the peace and salvation of the South, a dissolution of the 
Union.”15 The radicals seemed to operate on the assumption that only separate and 
immediate action by South Carolina would bring about a program of southern unity. 
Once South Carolina left the Union, the radicals thought, other southern states would 
surely stand with her. The radicals’ primary objective was to stir up agitation for 
immediate secession with the least amount of discussion possible.  
At the other end of the spectrum were the cooperationists led by James L. Orr of 
Anderson district. This faction had an earnest desire to defend slavery and southern 
rights, but they wanted to do so within the Union if possible. They would certainly 
choose slavery over Union if the choice was forced upon them, yet Orr and many of his 
followers had not given up entirely on the Union. Orr believed, like Calhoun, that a 
successful defense of slavery could only come about from a plan of southern unity. 
Robert W. Barnwell, a cooperationist and politician who had served South Carolina in 
various public offices since 1826, agreed and thought “the policy now avowed and 
zealously pressed into execution, of exciting South Carolina into a separate nation, seems 
                                                
15 William C. Davis, RHETT: The Turbulent Life and Times of a Fire-Eater (Columbia, SC.: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2001), 274, 278. 
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to me so wide a departure from our past course, and so fraught with danger to the 
institution which we all desire to defend, that I cannot refrain from expressing…my 
earnest dissent from it.” 16 Clearly, South Carolina’s most prominent politicians were 
divided over the best way to protect slavery. 
The first secession crisis in South Carolina produced personal bitterness and 
political wounds that would not heal quickly. The crisis had exhausted state politicians 
and South Carolinians were emotionally drained from the five year struggle. The 
cooperationists won the debate over immediate and separate secession because the 
majority of South Carolina citizens thought it was unwise to leave the Union alone. Fear 
of an internal slave insurrection, financial and commercial considerations, and a belief 
that the federal government would use force to keep the state in the Union seem to have 
been the primary reasons for rejecting separate state action.17 This does not mean, 
however, that a strong Unionist sentiment prevailed throughout the state.  
Indeed, nearly all South Carolina planter politicians had been in favor of 
secession, but there was disagreement on the method and proper procedure. Nevertheless, 
there was little disagreement on the constitutional right of a state to secede. When the 
state convention convened in the spring of 1852 the vast majority of secessionists and 
cooperationists passed a resolution confirming the right of secession by a vote of 136 t  
19. Of those dissenting were B.F. Perry and a few other Unionists along with the most 
extreme fire-eaters such as Maxcy Gregg who were disgusted with what they considered 
                                                
16 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Movement in South Carolina 1847-1852, 94-95; Ford, Origins 
of Southern Radicalism, 195-99; Henry H. Lesesne, “Robert Woodward Barnwell,” in The South Carolina 
Encyclopedia, Walter Edgar, ed., (Columbia, SC.: The University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 50-51; 
Barnwell quote is in the Charleston Courier, May 27, 1851. 
17 Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 209-10. 
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a pointless resolution and a course of action that translated into “absolute submission.”18 
The blueprints for secession had been drawn. The entire episode had been characterized 
by internal political factionalism. Ironically, factionalism co-existed with a spirit of unity 
over the right of South Carolina to secede. This trend where both factions agreed on the 
ends but disagreed over the means would continue up to 1860 and beyond.  
Meanwhile, national events continued to fester. The passage of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act in 1854 broke the relative calm in the state regarding the question over 
slavery in the territories. The act essentially repealed the Missouri Cmpromise by 
opening territories north of the 36 degrees thirty minutes to slavery. South Carolina 
accepted the repeal cheerfully and sent some 250-400 men to settle the Kansas territory in 
the hope of establishing a proslavery government. The majority of South Carolina 
politicians saw the passage of the act as a triumph for Calhoun’s co-property doct ine, 
which viewed any congressional restriction of slavery as unconstitutional. But the 
passage of the act resulted in some unintended consequences that would only exacerbate 
the growing sectional tension.  The most obvious result of this was the creation of the 
Republican Party which pledged to exclude slavery from all territories and represented 
the most serious challenge to the perpetuation of slavery. An armed race quickly ensued
to win Kansas for freedom or slavery by ballots, or if need be, by bullets. The ideological 
underpinnings were important to South Carolina as Kansas became the outpost for 
slavery, and therefore, to the South for white civilization. This renewal of sectional 
                                                
18 Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 211.  
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antagonism gave the radicals like Rhett and Maxcy Gregg another opportunity to push 
ahead with their agenda for secession and the creation of a southern confederacy.19 
While radicals in South Carolina continued to push ahead with their plans to 
secede and possibly form a southern confederacy, politics in the state went on as usual. 
The economic and political tensions throughout the 1850’s did not result in anything 
resembling a “revolution” in state politics. The legislature continued to play the dominant 
role in policy-making and the governor of the state retained his nominal and largely
ceremonial position as chief executive. However, throughout the 1850’s fierce debats in 
the legislature over representative apportionment, transportation, commerce, and 
industry, threatened the political harmony that the state had long taken pride in. At times 
these issues became explosive and “usually centered around fundamental disagreements 
over what role state and local governments should play in sponsoring or sanctioning 
economic development.”20  
Yet, even these volatile issues did little to change the basic structure of state 
government. Efforts at legislative reapportionment met with limited succes. The only 
concession the black-belt districts were willing to give to the white majority in the 
Upstate was the division of Pendleton district into two new districts, Anderson and 
Pickens. This compromise did little to solve the inequities in representation and the 
parishes continued to control state politics to a considerable degree.21 Although railroads 
                                                
19 Wallace, History of South Carolina,138-39; Sinha, Counter Revolution of Slavery, 127, 221. 
20 Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 280. 
21 Edgar, South Carolina, 346; Ever since 1808, representation in the state legislature had not been 
apportioned on the basis of white population alone. For the House of Representatives, white population and 
taxable property were the basis for the number of members representing a particular district or parish. For 
the Senate, each unit of local government was given one senator. As a result, the Lowcountry controlled the 
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began to appear in the countryside and cotton producers became more firmly entrenched 
in the market economy, neither this development nor political agitation in the legislature 
over democratic reform resulted in any fundamental change to the political culture within 
South Carolina.  
Yet, under the surface, important but subtle changes to South Carolina’s political 
culture were taking place. Ever since the Wilmot Proviso South Carolinians increasingly 
doubted the ability of the national Democratic Party to protect the South’s interests. By 
the time the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed Congress, the foundations for southern 
nationalism were already laid in South Carolina.22  When the proslavery Lecompton 
Constitution in Kansas was defeated in Congress, the radicals’ pointed out they had been 
right all along, that national parties could not be trusted, and that the best way for South 
Carolina to protect her interests was to pursue an independent course. The strategy the 
radicals’ pursued was one of fear and propaganda. The election of 1860 would be the 
deciding factor. The Mercury predicted “We deem it almost certain that within less than 
two years all true men in South Carolina or at Washington will stand together. At all 
events this is our hope. So strong is our conviction of the steady progress and fatal 
purposes of the powerful Black Republican faction, that this is our belief.”23 
                                                                                                                                                 
Senate and were over-represented in the House, although the inland districts did have a majority in the
lower chamber. Nevertheless, planter politicians from the Lowcountry continued to dominate the 
legislature and exert considerable influence, particularly in separatist politics. 
22 This is why James L. Orr’s efforts to align South Carolina back into the national Democratic Party struck 
a raw nerve. A large number of state leaders continued to believe it was wiser to pursue an independent 
course. Just when the crisis in Kansas was reaching a crescendo, Orr proposed that South Carolina 
participate in the Democratic national convention in C ncinnati. At that time, South Carolina had not 
participated in a national convention for over a decade. This issue once again sparked a lengthy and bitter 
debate in the South Carolina legislature. 
23 Harold S. Shultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in South Carolina 1852-1860 (Durham, NC.: Duke 
University Press, 1950), 166-67; Charleston Mercury, November 19, 1858. 
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Hindsight tells us the Mercury was correct in its prediction. Yet, the large middle 
ground between the extreme States’ Rights Party and the moderate National Democrats 
continued to gain ascendancy during this time of uncertainty. The death of A.P. Butler 
left a United States Senate seat vacant. On the third ballot James Henry Hammond was 
elected as a compromise candidate. Hammond’s success was curious. He appealed to the 
radicals but soon disappointed them by allying himself with the moderates. Throughout 
the summer of 1858 Hammond thought the best policy for the state was to remain in the 
Union and control the federal government through the cooperation of other southern 
states. This alarmed the radicals who saw the defeat of the Lecompton Constituti  as 
absolute proof that the National Democratic Party was unreliable when it came to 
protecting southern interests. According to Drew Faust, the South Carolina legisl tors 
“may have viewed Hammond as a convenient means of satisfying popular demands 
without posing any real threat.” The Charleston Evening News claimed Hammond was 
“the people’s candidate.”  His election “represented a new spirit in Carolina politics-a 
reinstatement of older values and a rejection of the techniques of demagoguery and 
electioneering that had in recent years made such remarkable inroads in the tate.”24 
The comment from the Charleston Evening News is instructive on the political 
culture of South Carolina. George Rable has convincingly argued “the South’s dilemma 
was primarily political, and whatever it’s economic and cultural effects, secession was a 
political decision- a decision shaped by the region’s political traditions but also by recent 
                                                
24 Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge, 
LA.: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 338-39; Quote from the Evening News is in Charles Cauthen, 
South Carolina Goes to War (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1950), 10. 
 18
and painful experience.” The “recent and painful experience” was not limited to northern 
attacks on slavery. Indeed, many South Carolina planter politicians were becoming 
disillusioned with perceived defects in the entire political process. Rable explains that 
“cries against demagoguery and spoilsmen originated in ancient fears of political 
corruption. Reservations about democracy-notably the “tyranny of numbers”- along with 
worries about the security of both liberty and property contributed to this dissatisfaction.” 
The ultimate fear, then, was that the political corruption which had so tainted the northern 
states and the nation’s capital would overwhelm southern honor and liberty. S cession, it 
was presumed, was the only way to avoid political contamination by establishing a 
“moral quarantine.”25  
The need to avoid contamination and begin some vague and undefined process of 
political purification became even more urgent after John Brown raided the federal 
arsenal at Harper’s Ferry Virginia. Brown’s raid was the capstone of a series of events 
that generated fear and moved the state ever closer to secession. Reaction to Brown’s raid 
across the state was convulsive. In the Upstate the Keowee Courier laid the blame 
squarely on the shoulders of the Republican Party, claiming that the “vile clamor of party, 
the struggle of Republicanism for power, has given an impetus to the abolitionist zeal of 
old Brown and his comrades, that impelled them forward in their mad career of treas n 
and bloodshed.”  In Spartanburg, the Carolina Spartan expressed regret at the “morbid 
feeling and fanaticism” which exists in certain parts of the North.  And in the 
Lowcountry, the Charleston Courier uttered sympathy for the citizens of Virginia who 
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had not yet recovered from the “civil war” that had engendered “their peaceful 
community.” Not surprisingly, the harshest words were expressed by the Mercury, which 
referred to the entire affair as a “small eruption on the surface of a diseased body” and 
warned that “large portions of the North are our enemies.” It went on to predict that “The 
Harper’s Ferry affair was but premature fruit. A whole harvest of sterner reb llion and 
bloodier collision is growing up and ripening from the seed these men have sown.”26 
Clearly, the newspapers across the state summarily denounced Brown’s aid and spread 
fear that the raid was but the first of a series of attempts to bring a race war to the 
South.27  
More important was the reaction by the state legislature. Governor William H. 
Gist’s message to the legislature that December was openly disunionist in tone. Af er 
rhetorically asking the members whether South Carolina could rely on the Democratic 
Party, he went on to say that if the South stood united “we could enforce equality in the 
Union or maintain our independence out of it.” The legislature responded by introducing 
sixteen radical resolutions in the House and several others in the Senate. Eventually the 
legislature agreed upon a joint resolution stating that a meeting of the slave states should 
be called immediately and that the governor should request other states to elect del gates; 
that a special commissioner be sent to Virginia to express South Carolina’s sympath  and 
reassure Virginia of the state’s desire to cooperate for the common defense; and finally 
that $100,000 be appropriated for military contingencies. Vigilance committees were 
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established at public meetings in nearly every community. These committees treated 
anyone from the North or any stranger as suspect. Violence was the primary means of 
driving suspicious individuals from the state. In addition, the General Assembly passed 
several laws clearly meant to intimidate outsiders from visiting South Carolin . These 
drastic actions were driven by a sense of fear that abolitionists were slowly making their 
way into the slaveholding communities and homes of South Carolina and that the master-
slave relationship might be in jeopardy after John Brown’s raid.28 
Although John Brown’s raid did much to rally the radical faction in the state, the 
radicals had already decided back in March of 1859 to launch a campaign that would 
prevent South Carolina from being represented at the National Democratic conventi at 
Charleston in May 1860. The arguments advanced by the radicals were essentially the 
same ones they had used in 1856. The Democratic Party, asserted the radicals, was 
hopelessly divided on issues dear to the South and as a result could not be trusted to 
protect southern interests. The national convention met on April 23 but did not go as 
James Orr planned.  It quickly became apparent that the convention was divided between 
two very different schools of thought regarding the interpretation of the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. A showdown between the forces led by Stephen A. Douglas on the 
one hand and those led by William L. Yancey of Alabama on the other soon consumed 
much of the debate in the convention. Because popular sovereignty was a vague formula 
that could be interpreted in many ways, disagreement between the opposing 
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interpretations divided the convention.29 The Mercury constantly criticized the 
convention and complained that “If the National Democratic Party cannot stand the test 
of principle, matters on which the destiny of the South depends, let us have a sectional 
party that can. Let the Convention break up.”30 Clearly, Rhett and the radicals wished to 
disrupt the convention to guarantee a Republican victory, thereby creating a crisis in 
which the South would be left no choice but to secede.31 
Rhett and the radicals got their wish. When the southern platform was defeated, 
thirteen of South Carolina’s delegates followed Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana out 
of the convention hall.32 The Mercury congratulated the southern states that withdrew 
from the convention and assured them “they are free of this ignoble struggle.” Not 
coincidently, the paper went on to reprint a speech by Calhoun that warned against 
forging ties with political parties of the North.33 The unity that Orr and the National 
Democrats had so eagerly hoped for remained elusive.  
With the National Democrats politically fractured there was a discernable trend 
towards disunion throughout the summer and fall. W.W. Boyce wrote on August 3 that if 
Lincoln was elected, all the southern states should withdraw from the Union. If they
choose not to do so, then South Carolina should secede alone “in the promptest manner, 
and by the most direct means.”  Boyce considered “the success of the Republican party in 
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the Presidential election as involving the necessity of revolution.”34 These views were 
echoed by the state legislature, Governor Gist, and every single member of the S u  
Carolina delegation in the federal House of Representatives. Outspoken radicals such a
Laurence M. Keitt argued that the Republicans, once they were in control of national 
politics, would do everything in their power to destroy slavery. John McQueen lost hope 
that Lincoln would be defeated and recommended immediate action by South Carolina. 
William Porcher Miles from Charleston threw caution to the wind and epitomized the 
radicals’ impatience when he complained to James Henry Hammond, “Let us act if we 
mean to act without talking.” In a letter reprinted in the Charleston C urier, Hammond 
thought that “there never was a sounder policy than at this time.” Even the cautious 
James L. Orr, leader of the National Democrats in South Carolina, began to change his 
mind. He wanted secession to be cooperative but admitted that living under Republican 
rule was impossible. If the South cooperated in a program of secession then “no Black 
Republican President shall ever execute any law within our borders unless at the point of 
the bayonet and over the dead bodies of her slain sons.” By all calculations, it was Orr’s 
influence that helped unify the state on a program of secession. At the end of August, 
those opposing secession were squarely in the minority.35 
Why South Carolina came to a general agreement on the question of secession 
during the summer of 1860 is not entirely clear. There can be little doubt that the two 
opposing political factions moved closer together after the convention moved to 
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Richmond. This can be partly explained in terms of leadership. It appears most leaders 
thought that the election of a Republican would mean secession in one form or another. A 
more likely explanation can be found in the propaganda material circulating throuhout 
the state in 1860. The political leadership of the state had been preparing South Carolina 
for the issues in 1860 for the past thirty years. A healthy dose of indoctrination in the 
principles of states’ rights and educating the populace of the necessity of secession under 
certain circumstances seemed to have paid off. The rhetoric stemming from this 
propaganda was hardly new, but it took a more cohesive form in 1860. Certainly the 
press contributed its fair share to the excitement and wisdom of secession, which is not to 
say that all the newspapers agreed with each other on every issue, but almost without 
exception their editors were “sound” in the doctrine of secession and in increasing 
number counseled resistance as the probability of Lincoln’s election grew in the summer 
and fall of 1860. Eventually, every newspaper in the state agreed that secession was 
necessary.36   
Less obvious but equally important was the political pamphlet. A group of 
Charleston secessionists organized “The 1860 Association” in September. There can be 
no question that the material produced by the association was meant to strike fear into the 
citizenry. John Townsend wrote tract No. 4 entitled The Doom of Slavery in the Union: 
Its Safety Out Of It. As the title makes clear, his thesis was that the Republicans would 
not stop at anything until slavery was destroyed in the South. Townsend’s pamphlet 
screamed that the South cannot “bend her neck to her enemies, and submit to have her 
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millions of slaves emancipated, her thousands of millions of property taken away from 
her, her citizens reduced to poverty and want, a servile and debased race elevated to an 
equality with her citizens, and their families degraded by such an inter course.”37 The 
non-slaveholders did not escape the attention of those writing political pamphlets. Trac  
No. 5, entitled The Interest of Slavery of the Southern Non-slaveholder, written by James 
D. B. DeBow, essentially reinforced what the slaveholding class in the state had been 
saying for years. The non-slaveholder, DeBow argued, had an even greater stake in the 
institution than the slaveholder for slavery had produced a high number of property 
owners who profited either directly or indirectly from the institution. Most important, 
emancipation would bring with it equality and a race war from which poor whites would 
be unable to escape.38 
References to a race war bring a social dimension into the secession equation. 
Steven Channing’s important study of secession in South Carolina underscores this 
critical dimension. Channing has argued that secession “was the product of logical 
reasoning within a framework of irrational perception.” This perception can be seen in 
the words of James Henry Hammond who drafted a letter to the South Carolina 
legislature asserting that the election of Abraham Lincoln was “no mere political or 
ethical conflict, but a social conflict in which there is to be a war of races, to be waged at 
midnight with the torch, the knife, & poison.” As this scenario was not frightening 
enough, Baptist minister James Furman added to the fear when he prophesized that it 
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would only be a matter of time before abolitionist preachers would be readily available 
“to consummate the marriage of your daughters to black husbands.” For Channing, “the 
conclusion is inescapable that the multiplicity of fears revolving around the maintenance 
of race controls for the Negro was not simply the prime concern of the people of South 
Carolina in their revolution, but was so very vast and frightening that it literally 
consumed the mass of lesser “causes” of secession which have inspired historians.”39 
Channing’s argument that secession was primarily a means to secure race control is well 
taken. Still, as Rable noted, secession was essentially a political decision. If controlling 
the black population in South Carolina was the primary concern of planter politicians, its 
political manifestation was realized in the act of secession. 
The growing unity in the state on the question of secession can be seen in the fall 
elections for the legislature.  Once again, unity of purpose prevailed in the midst of 
internal factionalism. The difference of opinion was not on the question of whether South 
Carolina should secede, but if she should secede separately or with the cooperation of 
other southern states. This was the same basic difference of opinion that had occurred 
nearly ten years earlier in the first secession crisis. Generally speaking, candidates simply 
had to pledge their support for a state convention in the event Lincoln was elected 
president. Only in a few cases were the candidates asked for specifics on their position.40 
When this did occur, their positions were so similar that little can be found to 
differentiate between them. In Yorkville, nearly all candidates agreed “The Black 
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Republicans seemed fatally bent on extirpating slavery” and South Carolina must 
“manfully resist or incur the disgrace of submission.”41 This type of rhetoric was 
generally representative of the campaign across the state. The Mercury did not relent on 
its criticism of those who were still hoping to keep the Union together.  It charged that 
those “vacillating, timid, wait-and-watch politicians have neglected the great essential 
principles of our Southern Institutions” and accused them of “personal aggrandizement, 
to secure favor, office, and banking money power.” The South should stand guard against 
all “enemies North, and Traitors South.”42 If some politicians thought the Union should 
be preserved, their voices were easily drowned out amidst the secessionist fervor that was 
quickly sweeping across the state.  In any case, the election resulted in a l gislature that 
was almost unanimously pledged to call a state convention if Lincoln was elected.43 
When the legislature met in special secession on November 5, it seems that 
cooperationist sentiment existed in the midst of strong secessionist feelings. The 
differences of opinion were serious, but “they were not in any important degree the 
disagreements of unionists and secessionists but rather lines of cleavage between sincer  
cooperationists and separate actionists, between those who would have South Carolina 
lead and those who preferred that South Carolina follow.”44 In other words, the 
factionalism that existed did not mean disagreement over secession but only over the 
proper method to follow. The Charleston Courier proudly claimed “There is now but one 
sentiment, and that is that we must meet this forced issue with prompt resistance.” I  went 
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on to warn that “the enemy” stares South Carolina in the face and “we must either make 
him surrender or he will complete our destruction.”45 Unity of purpose continued to 
outweigh division on procedure.  
As the legislature prepared to consider a convention bill a sharp battle ensued 
over when the convention should meet. Numerous resolutions were offered. For Rhett, 
the sooner the convention met the better. He suggested November 22, “in order that the 
members might be home at election day.” But there was a far more important reason for 
an early date, for longer the delay “the question would no longer be one of disunion, but 
one of co-operation.”46 Rhett had little patience for waiting any longer on the rest of the 
South; if other states choose to wait, then South Carolina should take the lead and act 
alone. Frustration ensued for the radicals as A.P. Aldrich complained to James Henry 
Hammond, “I do not believe the common people understand it, in fact I know they do not 
understand it; but whoever waited for the common people when a great movement was to 
be made. We must make the movement and force them to follow.”47 
Eventually the date of the convention was changed to December. The most 
obvious and important reason for the change occurred when South Carolina received 
reassuring news from Georgia. At this point cooperation with other southern states 
seemed more assured than ever. Governor Brown’s recommendation for a convention 
was well received in Georgia and several federal officers in Savannah ad Milledgeville 
had already resigned. But aside from events in Georgia, there was also considerable 
                                                
45 Charleston Courier, November 9, 1860. 
46 Charleston Courier, November 9, 1860. 
47 A.P. Aldrich to James Henry Hammond, November 25, 1860, Hammond Papers, quoted in Cauthen, 
South Carolina Goes to War, 133. 
 28
public pressure on the legislature to move the convention to an earlier date.48 The 
Charleston Courier reminded the legislature that “We must look to the moral and 
political effect of our movement upon the other Southern States and upon the people at 
large.” Although there was some danger in precipitation, the paper argued that “there is 
far more danger from that hesitation of policy that, by delaying action, we show to the 
South that South Carolina trembles in her shoes, and that South Carolina is not prepared 
to stand up to her principles of the past.” Sterner warnings came from the Mercury.49 
Whatever the exact reason for the change, and there is good reason to believe the news
from Georgia was decisive, the legislature approved the new date set for Dcember 17 by 
a vote of 117 to 0 in the House and 42 to 0 in the Senate. On November 10th James 
Chesnut Jr. resigned his seat in the United States Senate followed by Hammond the next 
day. With the exception of formalities, the Union was no more in South Carolina.50  
At long last the radicals had finally won the prize. Or had they? As the evidence 
makes clear, secession had to wait until it seemed certain that other southern states would 
follow. Rhett and his radical faction had done much to push South Carolina towards 
disunion over the previous fifteen years but were unsuccessful until Lincoln’s election. 
Whatever foggy vision the radicals had of southern nationalism during the first sece sion 
crisis, their vision was becoming clearer by 1860. Secession was an external revolution; it 
did not create an internal revolution within the state. Political harmony was cre ted from 
an outside threat, and therefore, what appeared to be a movement of unity on the surface 
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was actually artificial. The question of method had been answered when cooperation was 
assured in 1860 but now other and perhaps more difficult questions were raised. The 
political divisions that were formed throughout the 1850’s and during the secession criis 
are important because they give shape not just to secession but to joining the Confederacy 
as well. What was this new southern confederacy to look like? Was South Carolina 
merely interested in preserving the antebellum status quo, or were serious poltical, 
economic, and social alterations the desired end? Would the intense factionalism th t 
existed in the state continue once a southern confederacy was formed, or would it be 
reshaped in a way that was unintended? What would happen to the state’s existing 
political system should war occur? Would the legislature continue to exert primary 
control over state policy in this new situation, or would the governor be given expanded 
powers? What role would the state convention play in this process? In short, what was 
this “revolution” about? There was no shortage of differing opinions regarding these 
complex and ideological questions and as South Carolina politicians pondered these 
questions and proposed tentative answers, many must have wondered how much political 








The Nature of the Revolution 
In declining a nomination to the South Carolina secession convention, Andrew 
Magrath wrote to the editor of the Mercury and urged “we must avoid distraction:-we 
must banish division. Let us not have, in the selection of those who will represent us in 
that Convention, the influence of those feelings which belong to the action of ordinary 
political parties. In this issue we have but one party-that is our State.”51 The Mercury 
itself, which had been at the forefront of creating political divisions in the stat during the 
preceding decade, claimed that “Personal preferences should have no place in our 
counsels.”  It asked South Carolinians to “endeavor and see first whether a ticket of our 
best and ablest and soundest men, irrespective of any previous political and personal 
affinities, cannot be so arranged and brought out as to meet the views of the community 
at large, and obtain a general support.”52   
Magrath’s letter and the Mercury’s editorial are indicative of the type of political 
culture South Carolina politicians hoped secession would create. George Rable has 
termed this desire “A Revolution Against Politics.” The divisive effect of partisanship 
and factionalism would be eliminated in the interest of harmony.  It was hoped that 
selfish men would no longer make politics a profession. Rable explains that “a glorious 
past of wise statesmanship would be restored. Low taxes, limited government, and civic 
virtue would characterize a perfected republic built on the twin foundations of white 
liberty and black slavery.” The construction of this new republic would rest on social
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harmony, political consensus, and unquestionable legitimacy.53  Yet, old habits die hard, 
especially in South Carolina where a long history of political division had existed and 
specifically over the question of secession for the better part of the antebellum era. 
Whether the state’s leading politicians could agree and form a consensus on the nature of 
their revolution and on a program that would provide a basis for a southern slaveholding 
republic was by no means clear.  
On December 6 South Carolinians elected delegates to the secession convention. 
The nomination process was generally marked by mass meetings with candidates 
nominated to a single ticket. The idea was to fuse differing factions and present a 
delegation that was united on the issue of immediate secession. The effort to bury old 
party differences for the sake of unity caused some trouble in Charleston and reflected th  
bitter feelings still being felt between the cooperationists and radicals.54 Despite the 
Mercury’s insistence that “Personal preferences should have no place in our counsels,” it 
proceeded to classify candidates as “explicit” or “not explicit” on the question of 
immediate and permanent secession.55 This action caused much resentment on the part of 
the moderates who claimed that it was they who had helped unify the state on a program 
of secession. Cooperationists resented the arbitrary labeling of candidates who were 
sincere in their desire to protect the interests of South Carolina. Addressing a meeting at 
Institute Hall in Charleston, Edward McCradly explained the position of the 
cooperationists. “I have heard that I have been accused during the present canvass by 
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some of those who acted with me at that time [the first secession crisis], that I had 
receded from the position I then occupied. It is not so. What I was in 1850, I am in 
1860…But what was unattainable in 1850 is now within our reach, and I then insisted 
that this time would come.”56  Most districts across the state accepted the single ticket 
plan and nearly every candidate nominated to the convention was committed to 
immediate separate action.57 But the context had changed after Lincoln’s election. Now 
just about everyone in the state was committed to cooperation. Still, the episode reveals 
that factionalism within the state had not entirely disappeared in the weeks leading up to 
secession. 
That factionalism was still lingering in state politics can be seen in the election of 
a new governor. Senator James Chesnut Jr. was nominated by the Charleston Courier and 
Robert Barnwell Rhett by the Charleston Mercury. Benjamin J. Johnson was also a likely 
candidate. But a nomination also came from Edgefield, where Francis W. Pickens had 
recently returned from serving as ambassador to Russia.58 Soon after his return, Pickens 
addressed a crowd in Edgefield. He explained how South Carolina had been wronged by 
the federal government and reaffirmed his belief that secession was the “clear and 
indisputable right of a sovereign people.” Pickens was then invited to address the General
Assembly and did so on November 30. His speech clearly catered to the wishes of the 
radical secessionists and he assured them “I would be willing to appeal to the god of 
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battles-if need be, cover the state with ruin, conflagration, and blood rather than 
submit.”59   
Pickens was paving the way to the state’s executive office by first appealing to the 
cooperationists and then apparently changing his position to a more radical one. He thus 
seemed to satisfy both factions by acting as a compromise candidate, which was no doubt 
a central reason for his nomination. Rhett, who had done so much to bring about 
secession, was passed over for governor. The primary reason seems to have been  lack 
of trust in his leadership abilities. The famous botanist and diarist from Charleston, 
William Henry Ravenel, thought Rhett to be “the most untrustworthy politician in the 
State.” He lacked good judgment and “can never be relied on for statesmanship as a 
leader.”60 After five ballots in the legislature, Rhett withdrew his name and Pickens was 
elected on the seventh ballot.61 
The nomination of Pickens in order to bury differences seems to have worked. In 
Charleston, the Courier proclaimed “All rejoice that F.W. Pickens is elected governor at 
last. All parties are reconciled to the result.” In the state capital, the Southern Guardian 
presented Pickens as “a gentleman in every way competent to discharge the high and 
responsible duties of the office to which he has been chosen.” And in the Upstate, he was 
considered “a man of ability and experience, and withal, prudent in action.”62 Meanwhile, 
the secession convention met as planned on December 17 in Columbia. One study of the 
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secession conventions has identified that of the 169 delegates to the South Carolina 
convention, the average delegate possessed a total wealth of $104, 053.86. Moreover, 153 
delegates, or 90.5 per cent held slaves in 1860. The average holding based on total 
membership in the convention was 58.8 slaves, while the median was 37 slaves.63 Clearly 
this was a body composed of South Carolina’s planter-elite who no doubt spoke for their 
own interests. This had always been the intention of South Carolina politicians. To them, 
it was only natural that the state’s elite should rule.  
 David F. Jamison, who was president of the convention, addressed the members. 
After providing a detailed explanation as to why South Carolina was unsafe under the 
United States Constitution, he declared “Written Constitutions are worthless, unless they 
are written, at the same time, in the hearts, and founded on the interests of a people; and 
as there is no common bond of sympathy of interest between the North and the South, all 
efforts to preserve this Union will not only be fruitless, but fatal to the less numero s 
section.” He then closed his speech with Danton’s declaration before the critical ba tle of 
Valmy during the French Revolution: “To dare! and again to dare! and without end to 
dare!”64   
Jamison’s decision to quote Danton is curious. Was he serious? Did secession 
mean revolution? Perhaps so, but the kind of revolution secession was supposed to be 
remained ill-defined. Southerners wanted to link their revolution to the American 
Revolution of 1776. But Thomas Jefferson’s assertions of human equality understandably 
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caused unease among secessionists hoping for the creation of a slave republic firmly 
rooted in ideas of inequality. The Declaration of Independence then, was central to 
secession. It could be used by South Carolina politicians to deny egalitarian principles but 
it could also be invoked to defend an oppressed people from a tyrannical government. In 
this case, Lincoln and the Republicans surely represented a threat to white liberty. But 
there was another problem that had little to do with Lincoln and the Republicans. This 
was the threat to liberty that could come from revolution itself. George Rable has argued 
that by its very nature the “right of revolution was such a latitudinarian idea that by 
implication it might well lead to the kind of radical-and if one dared think it-Jacobinical 
revolution that the cooperationists had warned against and the secessionists feared.” At 
the very least, contemporary southern politicians embraced the notion of a “conservative 
revolution.” Seemingly paradoxical in nature, Rable has observed that southerners “could 
redefine revolution to suit their present situation…A Southern revolution would 
presumably harmonize with Southern traditions of state sovereignty, individual liberty, 
and slavery.”65  But would the sovereignty of states, individual liberty, and the institution 
of slavery remain secure after secession? South Carolina politicians hoped so an
probably thought it would be safer in a southern confederacy. Yet, the future remained 
unpredictable. 
Before the convention could proceed to business a resolution was proposed to 
adjourn to Charleston on account of a smallpox outbreak in Columbia. This caused a 
temporary panic among some radicals who thought any delay might have an ill effect on 
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other southern states. As a gesture to assure the other cotton states of South Carolina’s 
intentions, John A. Inglis offered a resolution that “South Carolina should forthwith 
secede from the Federal Union, known as the United States of America” before 
adjourning to Charleston. The resolution was unanimously adopted.66 When the 
convention reassembled in Charleston it began its business of separating the state from 
the Union. Cooperation with other southern states seemed more assured then ever.67 On 
December 20 the committee of an ordinance of secession made its report and was 
adopted by another unanimous vote of all 169 delegates. All members of the South 
Carolina delegation in Congress quickly resigned. The convention then moved from St. 
Andrews Hall to Institute Hall where the governor and both houses of the legislature 
could be present for the ceremonial signing of the ordinance. The atmosphere in 
Charleston was explosive. Three thousand people cheered the members of the convention 
as they walked in to sign the document severing the ties of South Carolina to the Union. 
The day after the signing, the Mercury proclaimed December 20 “an epoch in the history 
of the human race. A great Confederated Republic, overwrought with arrogant and 
tyrannous oppressions, has fallen from its high estate amongst the nations of the 
earth…The problem of self-government under the check-balance of slavery, has secured 
itself from threatened destruction.”68 
The Mercury’s editorial is instructive. If the exact nature of the revolution was 
murky there can be no question as to the basic and fundamental reason that caused the act 
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of secession. Fear over the future of slavery was clearly the central and pivotal reason for 
the act. A. G. Magrath, who would be South Carolina’s governor in the closing months of 
the war, wrote afterwards during his imprisonment at Fort Pulaski near Savannah Georgia 
on the cause of secession. Magrath’s words provide a fascinating illustration of h w
fundamental the institution of slavery was to daily life and how fear over its future 
existence lay at the root of secession: 
All of the transactions of life were based upon it; all of the arrangements for the 
progress of society were made with reference to it; and the civilization, I may say, 
of the people in the States in which slavery existed, were regarded as unavoidably 
connected with it; inseparably dependent upon it. It was thus that the remarkable 
unanimity was produced in all of these states. No other cause would have  
produced it. I have said that other considerations attached themselves to it; they 
were merely incidents to it; of themselves they could never have produced the  
same result…It was the apprehension of the invasion of this right of property 
which…was the motive power of the revolution.69 
In addition to the Secession Ordinance, the convention also produced two other 
important documents. The first one, headed by Christopher Memminger, was the 
“Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of South 
Carolina.” The Declaration essentially defended the right of secession under the compact 
theory of the Union. The exercise of that right was explicitly justified in the document on 
the basis that the northern states had infringed upon the compact because of their refusal 
to abide by the Constitution in regard to slavery. In the Declaration, slavery was at the top 
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of the list for justifying secession. Now that Lincoln was about to assume the offic  f the 
presidency, the convention believed “slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction.” The 
Republican Party would wage a war “against slavery until it shall cease throughout the 
United States.”70 This brought about some opposition from certain members who were 
rightfully concerned that such a plainly stated reason for secession might not invoke 
sympathies around the world. An effort to send the Declaration back to committee failed, 
however, by a vote of 124 to 31. Laurence Keitt was opposed to any alteration of the 
document because, he reminded the convention, “slavery is the great central point from 
which we are now proceeding.”71   
The second document, written by Rhett, was entitled an “Address to the 
Slaveholding States,” and intended to show that the entire crisis resulted from the 
overthrow of the United States Constitution. According to Rhett, the North’s blatant 
violation of the Constitution was “The one great evil, from which all other evils have 
flowed.” For Rhett, northerners and southerners were two distinct people with divergent 
interests. The Constitution was an experiment. “The experiment has failed” said Rhett. It 
had failed to unite two very different peoples. Moreover, the northern states, by 
possessing a majority in Congress, had created a “consolidated” government that 
impinged on the rights of the states. In any case, southerners would constitute a great 
nation on their own and they deserved their own country. “All we demand of other 
peoples is, to be let alone, to work out our high destinies.”72 Rhett’s Address celebrated 
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the breaking up of the United States and left no room for looking back or returning to the 
Union under any circumstances. He clearly designed it to permanently settle th  question 
of whether an independent southern confederacy should be formed.73  
The convention answered the question with an affirmative. However, in the mean-
time, South Carolina would operate as an independent republic. To realize the new 
situation South Carolina leaders would have to alter the existing administrative 
organization of the state. Well before the first shot was ever fired the convention began to 
change the existing status quo in regard to the state’s long history of political pra tice and 
culture. The most obvious and drastic changes made to the State Constitution were in the 
powers delegated to the governor. To solve the potential problems facing the state as a 
result of secession, convention members thought that a stronger executive was needed.  It 
was generally understood that the convention had the power to amend the state 
constitution since this was the primary function and purpose of conventions in the first 
place. Accordingly, the convention passed an ordinance “To amend the Constitution of 
the State of South Carolina in respect to the Executive Department.” This measure 
enlarged the duties of the governor and delegated powers to him that were unknown in 
the antebellum period. Among the newly delegated powers, the governor was authorized 
to conduct foreign relations, make diplomatic appointments and treaties, and allowed to 
choose a cabinet74 responsible to him. In short, the governor was now given powers that 
were formerly exercised by the President of the United States.75  
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Unfortunately, Pickens’s personality was not well suited for such power. His mien 
was very authoritative and he did not take well to the opinions of others. A recent 
biographer of Pickens believes his “aloofness and overbearing personality were real 
handicaps. Egoism and arrogance were not uncommon in Carolina cavaliers, but Pickens 
demonstrated these traits to the fullest. He gained notoriety as a pedant. Past political 
intrigues and battles had caused many of the state’s most prominent families to d slike 
him…He was a man of ideas, an acute observer, but not a man of firm action.”76 His was 
not a personality that was well suited to handle the delicate situation involving the federal 
occupation of Fort Sumter.  
On the night of December 26 Major Robert Anderson moved his federal garrison 
from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. Francis Pickens was in an unenviable position. To 
most South Carolinians, the occupation of the forts surrounding Charleston Harbor by a 
foreign nation was unacceptable. The story of diplomatic maneuvering in regard to Fort 
Sumter has been well told by many historians77 and it is not necessary to recount the story 
in detail here. However, it is worth noting that the entire episode is but another exampl 
of how political factionalism came to play an important role in state politics. From the 
beginning Pickens was under heavy pressure and constant criticism from the radicals to 
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seize Fort Sumter by force. The Mercury kept up a steady fire of attacks on both Pickens 
and the government in Washington.78 Several diplomatic blunders by Pickens and his 
handling of the commissioner’s mission to Washington did not improve the situation or 
his image.79  Mary Boykin Chesnut observed that when Major Anderson had moved into 
Fort Sumter, Governor Pickens was “sleeping serenely.” She was depressed that the kind 
of men put in office at the time of the crisis was “invariably some sleeping dead head 
long forgotten and passed over.”80 
The situation was somewhat complicated by events soon to take place in 
Montgomery. Using good judgment, Pickens seems to have pursued a conservative 
policy that sought to obtain Fort Sumter by peaceful means. He understood the state was 
unprepared to force a demand for surrender but wanted to appear bold and courageous. 
Accordingly, he used aggressive language but essentially hesitated between indep dent 
South Carolina action and delay until a southern confederacy could be formed and 
assume responsibility. This greatly upset some radicals, especially Rhett, w o thought 
Pickens ought to attack Fort Sumter immediately without waiting for events to unfold at 
the convention in Montgomery. On January 21 Rhett walked into Pickens’s temporary 
office and demanded that Fort Sumter be taken at once. “Certainly, Mr. Rhett; I have no 
objection! I will furnish you with some men, and you can storm the work yourself” 
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answered Pickens. Rhett responded “But, sir, I am not a military man!” “Nor I either,” 
retorted Pickens, “and therefore I take the advice of those who are!”81 The Mercury even 
advocated that South Carolina avoid entering a southern confederacy until Anderson was 
removed from Fort Sumter, while the Columbia Southern Guardian wondered “Why not 
is Fort Sumter attacked?”82 Clearly, the pressure on Pickens from the radical faction to 
act decisively was very great.  
On the other hand, there was pressure from moderates as well, such as Alfred 
Huger, who asked “Is not the refusal on the part of Major Anderson to receive 
reinforcements binding upon us not to molest him and his handful of men? Should he not 
be considered as an object of our care instead of assault?”83 Perhaps Huger’s moderation 
was atypical in the state, but it was quite typical of the sentiment outside the state. 
Pickens was under considerable pressure from political leaders across the Sou  to 
exercise caution. In Virginia Governor Letcher thought the times demanded “coolness, 
calmness, and firmness, united with prudence, wisdom, moderation and patriotism.” He 
was fearful that “an error committed now can never perhaps be corrected.”84 J fferson 
Davis suggested Anderson’s presence was a matter of pride and advised Pickens that 
delay was the prudent course to take. Similar advice was offered by Governor Brown in 
Georgia.85  
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On the whole, the course Pickens chose was a policy of “wait and see.” The tactic 
worked well, although Pickens upset both factions in the state to some degree. The 
radicals were disappointed that the newly-elected governor was not more aggressive in 
his determination to seize Fort Sumter, and they understandably accused him of 
indecisiveness and delay. It was a charge that would be later used effectiv ly by his 
political enemies. The moderates, while pleased that Pickens had avoided a confrontation, 
were somewhat taken back by his decision to take matters into his own hands instead of 
waiting for responses from the commissioners who had been sent to Washington to 
negotiate for the forts. It was a situation where no faction would be entirely pleased but 
Pickens’s course of action on the whole seems to have met with general approval. The 
legislature, for example, unanimously approved Pickens’s course in regard to the S ar of 
the West and Fort Sumter. The legislature further pledged itself to “earnest, vigorous, and 
unhesitating support,” for every measure that was adopted to defend the state. Fortunately 
for Pickens, the Confederate government assumed control of the harbor defenses in early 
March.86 For the time being, Pickens could breathe a sigh of relief.  
While Pickens was handling the situation regarding Fort Sumter, the convention 
was busy dealing with the first efforts to establish a southern confederacy. Rhett offered 
the first resolution to put the plan in motion. On December 26 he proposed an ordinance 
specifying Montgomery as the meeting place and February 13 as the date for a southern 
convention of slaveholding states. Although Rhett’s ordinance was tabled, the reports and 
resolutions adopted December 31 were nearly identical to Rhett’s original proposal. They 
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called for South Carolina to elect a commissioner to each southern state which had called 
its own state convention and that the commissioners propose a conference of the said 
states to meet at the earliest possible date before March 4. They further stipulated that the 
United States Constitution be the basis for a provisional constitution; that voting be done 
by the states at the proposed conference; that South Carolina’s delegates be elected by 
convention ballot.87 In accordance with the report, the first commissioners were elected 
on January 2 and were soon sent out to preach secession to the other southern states.88 
In the balloting for delegates to Montgomery the convention selected a body of 
men who were, for the most part, moderate in their political makeup. With the exception 
of Rhett and Keitt, it was a group that had been in favor of cooperation and moderation in 
1852.89 Emory Thomas has argued that secession was basically a negative process. Onc 
secession became a reality, there remained the task of building a nation. More 
importantly, Thomas explains that moderation prevailed at the Montgomery conventi 
because “the fundamental goal of the Southern revolution was the preservation of the 
Southern life style as Southerners then lived it.” Southerners wanted to preserve the 
existing status quo and were “not willing to expand or intensify that status quo.” In short, 
Confederates “were more than happy with the world they already had.”90 There is much 
to be said for accepting the model offered by Thomas. But is his interpretation applicable 
to South Carolina? Were Rhett and his supporters merely content to accept the status quo, 
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or did Rhett have a very different vision of the type of government than the one created at 
Montgomery? If so, what do these differences say about the revolution for the radical 
faction in the state? Answering these ideological questions can illuminate serious 
differences not only at Montgomery but in the Palmetto State itself.  
In the whirlwind of secession there was little time to debate such important 
questions and reflect on the nature of the nascent republic. Speed was of the essence to 
the radicals, whose fear of “reconstruction” of the old Union was ever present. Still, 
Rhett’s ideas of what the new nation should be was deep and fixed. At heart Rhett was an 
ideologue. He left little room for compromise and rejected any plans that would appeal to 
the Border States. His most recent biographer explains that “his vision encompassed 
really only the most solidly slavery-based states in the Deep South, the cotton, rice, and 
sugar states that could be trusted to see their interests wholly wrapped up in maintaining 
their institutions free of the taint of lingering Union pangs.”91 Rhett’s vision will be 
analyzed in more detail below, but there can be no doubt that the factionalism which 
existed in South Carolina over the previous fifteen years accompanied the delegation to 
Montgomery. Alexander Stephens said of the South Carolina delegation, “No two of 
them agree. They are all jealous of each other- no news- there is no harmony or cordiality 
among them- always respectful in debate but they talk about and against each other.” N 
other delegation stood as evenly divided during the Montgomery convention as did South 
Carolina’s.92 
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Exactly why the South Carolina delegation was so divided is not easy to explain. 
The delegation certainly played a prominent role at the Montgomery convention. Yet, the 
delegation was nonetheless divided and there is reason to believe its lack of unity 
stemmed from Rhett’s vision of what the new government should be. Rhett was not 
looking to create a government that simply protected the existing status quo in the Sou . 
His dream was to create a government that was much different than the one that was 
created in Montgomery. Thomas has correctly pointed out that the “Confederacy cre ted 
at Montgomery was not exactly what the super-Southerners like Rhett, Ruffin, and 
Yancey wanted.”93 The first important dispute was on the purpose of the convention 
itself. For Rhett, the meeting at Montgomery was simply a constitutional convention to 
establish a permanent government. A provisional government was dangerous since it 
might result in “reconstruction” of the old Union. One of the first resolutions Rhett 
offered was to appoint a committee that would “report to this Congress a constitution for 
a permanent government of the States represented in this Congress.”94 With the exception 
of Barnwell, the entire South Carolina delegation opposed his view.95  
The Provisional Constitution created at Montgomery was criticized in South 
Carolina, especially by the Mercury. It was “unfortunate and mal apropos that the stigma 
of illegitimacy of slavery should be placed upon the institution of slavery by a 
fundamental law against the slave-trade. In our opinion it is a matter of policy, and not of 
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principle.” It regretted “that any Provisional Government was formed at all” and 
expressed amazement “that any Southern Government, whether for a month or a year, 
would sanction the policy of Protective Tariffs.”96 L.W. Spratt voiced his concern that if 
the slave-trade was not reopened then the future of slavery itself might be in jeopardy. A 
slave population at least equal to the white was necessary for the institution to continue. 
Spratt pointed to Virginia where “there are about 500,000 slaves to about 1,000,000 
whites; and as at least as many slaves as masters are necessary to the constitution of a 
slave society.” “Virginia,” Spratt said, “does not truly know whether she is of the North 
or South in this great movement.” In any case, the Confederacy was a slave republic and 
any prohibition on the slave-trade would be fundamentally at odds with the principles of 
a slave society. Even before a Permanent Constitution was adopted Spratt was already 
predicting that “to this end another revolution may be necessary.”97 
When the Permanent Confederate Constitution was adopted by the Provisional 
Congress on March 11, there was little of the South Carolina program in it. Oddly 
enough, it was Rhett who chaired the committee that drafted the document. Rhett thought 
the new government must be a slaveholder’s republic in the purest sense. Yet, almost 
every proposal by the South Carolina delegation was defeated.98 This included a lengthy 
list of attempts to remedy what were considered defects in the Permanent Constituti . 
As previously mentioned, the motion to strike out the constitutional prohibition of the 
slave trade was supported by some in South Carolina who saw the trade as necessary for 
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the survival of the institution. More important, supporters of the slave-trade quite 
reasonably claimed it was inconsistent for a slave republic to contain provisions lmiting 
the expansion of the very institution it was created to protect. To those who supported 
reopening the Slave Trade, if slavery as an institution was right then the slave trade was a 
natural extension of the system; it too was right and should be expressed as a principle in 
the constitution. This motion, however, did not receive the support of any other state.99  
W.W. Boyce proposed an amendment that would guarantee “the right of 
secession of any State from this Confederacy.” Here again, the South Carolina delegation 
stood alone.100 Obviously, the state which led the secession movement could see no 
reason why such a fundamental principle would be objected to. Laurence Keitt hoped to 
strike out the clause by which only three-fifths of the slave population was counted for 
purposes of representation. Keitt wanted all slaves to be counted for determining 
representation. Given the number of slaves in South Carolina, this measure would have 
greatly strengthened South Carolina’s position in the Confederate Congress. This 
proposal was also lost.101 The South Carolina delegation also wished to give state 
legislatures the exclusive power of choosing presidential electors. This is hardly 
surprising since South Carolina’s constitution did exactly this. The delegation must have 
been genuinely frustrated when this too was defeated and left to lie on the table.102  
But it was the failure to prohibit the future admission to the Confederacy of 
nonslaveholding states that generated the greatest uproar in South Carolina. The Mercury 
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thundered that “we are in danger, if the views of the Constitution-makers are carried into 
practice, of being dragged back eventually into the political affiliation with the States and 
peoples from whom we have just cut loose.”103 A southern confederacy could never be 
safe if admission was open to free states since “Anti-slavery has been taken in with their 
mothers’ milk, grown with their growth and strengthened with their strength, until so 
thoroughly assimilated into their constitutions as to become a part of their political 
principles, their ethics, and their religious faith.” Almost without exception “the universal 
sentiment” in the North “is one of condemnation of Southern civilization and Southern 
citizens.” Since the North and South are “two distinct people,” would it be sensible for 
southerners “after ridding themselves of the perilous connection,” to allow a people “s 
inimical, and whose hostility by that instrumentality has already proved both troublesome 
and dangerous to the South” to ever join the Confederacy? The answer was self-evident 
since the question involved “little less than the destinies of the South.”104 The Keowee 
Courier was hardly less outspoken in its opposition and predicted that the inclusion of 
Free States would spell disaster for the Confederacy.105 
If Rhett was frustrated that most of the South Carolina program was rejected at 
Montgomery, he must have been even more disappointed when he was not given an 
administrative position in the new government. He certainly felt entitled to the presidency 
as a reward for his lifelong efforts at establishing a southern nation, and he surely felt that 
his vision was the best one to shape the new government. This dream, however, quickly 
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faded as he found his own delegation unwilling to support him.106 Nor did the South 
Carolina delegation, composed mostly of former cooperationists, stand by Rhett in his bid 
for Secretary of State. That prestigious cabinet position went to Robert Toombs of 
Georgia, much to the dismay of Rhett’s supporters in South Carolina. Soon after the 
appointment, the Mercury complained “this post was due to South Carolina, who 
proposed and inaugurated secession, and whose people have hitherto borne the chief 
hardships and losses of the Revolution.” The editorial went on to say Rhett “would have 
been pleased” to have received the appointment and did not hide the fact the South 
Carolina delegation, with the exception of Keitt, “who is no friend to Mr. Rhett- are all of 
the old co-operation party of 1852.”107 As for the selection of president, the delegation 
was also divided. “Everyone determined his own course for himself” remarked William 
Porcher Miles. Boyce expressed violent opposition to Jefferson Davis as did Laurence 
Keitt. But Robert Barnwell and James Chesnut Jr. supported Davis along with Miles. And 
it was Barnwell who persuaded Rhett (after strenuous effort) to cast the deciding vote for 
Davis.108 It was hardly a showing of solidarity and clearly, the state’s long history of 
political factionalism would not simply fade away for the sake of unity. 
It is tempting to over-emphasize South Carolina’s opposition to the Permanent 
Constitution. Obviously there was much disgust that the amendments offered by the 
South Carolina delegation were rejected. But it would be a profound mistake to assert 
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that all South Carolinians were unanimously opposed to its ratification. It would be an 
even greater mistake to assume that dissension and disillusionment with the Confederate 
experiment was already widespread before the first shot was fired. Indeed, th  Permanent 
Constitution was generally well received in the Palmetto State. The Charleston Evening 
News thought “every one seems pleased” and expressed its hope that “the radicals will 
not wage a wicked and suicidal opposition to any of its provisions.” From Pickens Court 
House, the Keowee Courier believed the new document to be “the best Constitution yet 
formed for the government of man.” Even the M rcury considered it “the best 
Constitution, for the security of liberty and justice, the world has ever seen.” However, it 
was quick to point out there were “several serious defects.”109 It was on these perceived 
defects that considerable opposition occurred in the South Carolina convention. The 
Permanent Constitution held all the cards for factional division in South Carolina. Nearly 
every point of contention had already been debated in the legislature during the previous 
fifteen years. Now, when unity was of the utmost importance, the convention’s actions 
would determine whether South Carolina could accept and ratify the new constitution. 
The debate can also tell us much about the radicals’ vision and the future of the 
Confederacy. The radicals may have lost at Montgomery but they were to be heard again 
once the debate over ratification began in South Carolina.  
It is significant that only South Carolina seriously debated the merits of the 
Constitution. Across the South state conventions were quick to avoid procedural delay 
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and ratified the Constitution with near unanimity.110 But in South Carolina the debate was 
lengthy and often bitter, reflecting not only the general discourse of South Carolina’s 
political culture but also its reputation as the most radical of the southern states.  Th  
South Carolina convention reassembled on March 25 to consider ratifying the 
Confederate Constitution in secret session. Within three days after the conventi  
reassembled, Gabriel Manigault of Charleston offered a resolution expressing the 
convention’s conviction that the Constitution “is imperfect and objectionable, and ought 
to be amended on the following points.” These were listed as being first, the possibility of 
“leaving the door open to the admission of non-slaveholding States into this 
Confederacy”; second, “In adopting the basis of only three-fifths of the slaves in 
calculating federal population”; third, “In granting the Government of the Confederacy an 
unlimited power of indirect taxation”; fourth, “In making the prohibition to import 
Africans a constitutional principle, and not merely giving to the Confederate Government 
the power to prohibit it as a matter of expediency”; fifth, “In continuing the Post Office 
monopoly in the hands of the Confederate Government.”111 J. Izard Middleton thought 
the Constitution did nothing to guarantee “the right and power of self-government at 
home.” He then proposed a resolution stating the Constitution “cannot be accepted by 
South Carolina, unless it be amended in all the particulars above specified.”112  
As with the Provisional Constitution, it was the first of these grievances that 
caused the greatest opposition. The Mercury was severely critical of the defect, observing 
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that “in South Carolina it is looked upon with alarm.” It admitted “there would be some 
opposition, but no one ever dreamed it would assume so formidable an appearance.”113 
Rhett addressed the issue with a resolution on April 2 which declared “this State does not 
consider herself bound to enter or continue in confederation with any State not tolerating 
the institution of slavery within its limits by fundamental law.” The resolution was tabled, 
however, and nothing further was done.114 There was general agreement that amendments 
were needed but a motion to consider amendments before ratification failed to pass by
forty-six votes. A motion to immediately call a constitutional convention was also lost by 
a vote of 101 to 44. The convention did, however, agree to consider amendments after the 
vote on ratification. It was resolved that once the Confederate government was “securely 
established and in peaceful operation, the State of South Carolina ought to demand that, 
two other States concurring, the Congress shall summon a Convention of all the States, to 
take into consideration the following amendments to the said Constitution, to wit.”115  
The proposed amendments included remedies to the grievances already indicated. 
They were agreed to by a vote of 117 to 15 and “indicate the almost unanimous opinion 
that amendments were desirable but that agitation for them should be postponed until a 
more appropriate time.”116 On April 3 the convention voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
ratification, the vote being 138 to 21.117 Significantly, Rhett voted in favor of ratification, 
indicating general acceptance of the document for the radical faction. Of course, not all 
radicals were content. L.W. Spratt, commenting on the prohibition of the slave trade 
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thought “our whole movement is defeated…thence another revolution. It may be painful, 
but we must make it.”118  
This was the second time that Spratt thought another revolution was not only 
desirable, but absolutely necessary. It was not that Spratt and the radicals were calling for 
continuous revolution. They did not want one revolution after another. Rather, the 
radicals did not consider the revolution complete. Radicals were actually conservative 
men who were seeking to preserve a status quo that was yet to be achieved. Radicals
were uncertain if this status quo could be achieved through the Confederate government. 
For them, the Constitution was one means to an end that was still evolving. Having 
worked for an independent southern nation for the past decade, the radicals were not 
content to quietly acquiesce to a document they considered imperfect on several key 
issues they had so adamantly supported during the antebellum era. Many of the radicals 
were ideologues who held deeply rooted convictions about what this southern 
confederacy was supposed to be. For men like Rhett, Keitt, Gist, and others of their 
tenacity, concern over appeasing the Upper South, let alone the Border States, was of 
secondary importance to principle. If some have wondered why Rhett displayed such 
violent anger towards the Confederate government throughout the course of the Civil 
War, it is reasonable to assume the roots of his discontent can be traced to the debate over 
ratification of the Permanent Constitution and the creation of the Confederacy.  
George Rable was only partially correct when he argued “ardent secessionist  
seeking to dissolve the Union paid little attention to the long-run consequences. The most 
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earnest Southern “nationalists” (if they can even be called that) spoke and wrote in only 
the vaguest terms about their “nation’s” characteristics and prospects.  Despite their 
flaming rhetoric, they had no more of a blueprint for the future than did cooperationists, 
who appealed to conservatism, caution, and fear of revolution.”119  It is certainly 
plausible and probably accurate that the radicals paid little attention to the long-run 
consequences. But Rhett and other radicals in South Carolina did have a vision of what a 
southern nation should look like. Perhaps they were unrealistic in their expectations but 
they nevertheless at the time of ratification seemed determined to push ahead wit  
another revolution. It was critical to them because of past political experiences in the 
Union. More than anyone else, the radicals had voiced violent opposition to the existing 
political structure of the United States. This was a chance, perhaps their only cha ce, to 
purify a political system that had gone wrong. The radicals were aware that war loomed 
on the horizon and understood that they must make temporary concessions until the 
Confederacy was peacefully established and stable. They understood the need to be 
practicable but they also wanted to carry the revolution through to its fullest 
manifestation, which was the radical agenda Rhett had been espousing for years.  
On the other hand, ratification was a clear victory for the moderate faction. For 
them, the Constitution was both the means and ends of the revolution. They sought to end 
the movement as quickly as possible so it might not spin out of control and alienate key 
states in the Upper South. It is difficult to determine exactly how many voting cizens in 
South Carolina were either radical or moderate. Part of the difficultly is that these 
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positions were not static and they could fluctuate depending on the time, issue, and 
unfolding of events. But Emory Thomas is probably correct when he observed that 
“Southerners generally had adopted radical rhetoric and tactics to transform their 
ideology in to nationalism; but once that transformation had occurred in secession, the 
radicals became superfluous.”120 Perhaps the radicals became superfluous in South 
Carolina as well, but not at first. Their agenda was seriously debated and considered at 
length in the convention. Nevertheless, considering that the South Carolina delegation to 
Montgomery was composed of moderates and former cooperationists, and given the 
lopsided vote in the state convention favoring ratification of the Constitution, Thomas’s 
point is well taken. The radicals, who were still trying to conserve a status quo that was 
yet to be achieved, still did not consider the revolution complete. The revolution would 
go on. But would it go on in a way that moved away from the radical view or from the 
moderate view? Would the moderates be able to end the revolution and uphold South 
Carolina’s political tradition of individualism, local autonomy, limited government, a d 
keep power vested in the legislature?  
There also remained one larger and nagging question. Before the convention 
adjourned on April 10, a difference of opinion arose as to whether or not the convention 
should adjourn sine die. There were some who thought that once the Confederate 
Constitution was ratified, the business of the convention was complete. The convention 
had written a new constitution, taken South Carolina out the Union, and provided an 
ordinance to prepare the state for the possibility of war. Those tasks had been 
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accomplished and many thought it was the convention’s duty to dissolve itself. However, 
a great many also thought the convention should adjourn subject to call of the president if 
some possible future emergency arose. After lengthy debate it was agreed that President 
Jamison could reconvene the body at any time before January 1, 1862. If, however, it was 
not reassembled by that date then the convention’s existence would end.121 Seemingly a 
trivial matter, it held all the cards for a fundamental and explosive debate over the proper 
exercise of power and sovereignty. A war which promised to touch South Carolina’s 
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Chapter Three 
The Exigencies of War: The Convention and  
Executive Council 
On the eve of secession South Carolina was ill-prepared for war. The militia 
system had not been reorganized since 1841 and enforcement of those out-dated 
provisions had been inadequate.122 Governor Gist and the legislature took preliminary 
steps in November 1860 but it was not until December 17, the day the convention met, 
that the new legislature acted in a decisive manner. It passed “An ACT to Provide an 
Armed Military Force” which established a volunteer system based on the existing 
militia. Governor Pickens was authorized “to call into the service of the state, from time 
to time, such portion of the militia as he may deem necessary and proper.”  One volunteer 
company of infantry from each infantry battalion of the militia was called into service for 
twelve months and the Governor was authorized to impose a draft if any battalion did not 
fill its quota in thirty days.123 State coercion, it seemed, would take the place of local 
autonomy to help fill regiments. In these first months of secessionist fervor few 
complaints were voiced against such measures and nobody seems to have commented on 
their paradoxical nature.124 While there was general acquiescence to these measures in 
the beginning it remained to be seen if similar state actions would receive support in the 
future.  
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The act also authorized the governor to raise several cavalry regiments for state 
defense not exceeding twelve months. All of these forces were to be “fully armed and 
equipped when mustered into service” by the state.125 The convention gave the governor 
further authority on January 1 to call into service “existing Volunteer Companies” 
attached to the militia “until superseded by the organization of the force provided for by 
the recent Act of the General Assembly.”126 This was a response of the convention to 
Major Anderson’s occupation of Fort Sumter and allowed for the immediate formatin of 
volunteer companies for six months. A regular military establishment was provided for 
on January 28 by the legislature. This time, the legislature stipulated “all non-
commissioned officers and privates shall be enlisted to serve for a period of three years, 
unless sooner discharged.”127  With the legislative acts of December 17 and January 28 
and the convention resolution of January 1, South Carolina had provided the first troops 
for the possibility of war. These measures were designed to put the state on a more 
permanent war-footing. Both the legislature and the convention were doing their utmost
to provide for the common defense and at this point, power was exercised evenly 
between the legislature and the convention. Neither of these measures raised any protest 
as they were consistent with the state constitution. Governor Pickens had also done a fine 
job solving the state’s deficiency in small arms by purchasing some 300,000 pounds of 
cannon and musket powder from Hazard’s Mills in Connecticut.128 By all appearances 
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the legislature, convention, and governor were acting in unison on important military 
considerations.  
Meanwhile, Lincoln issued orders on April 4 to re-supply Fort Sumter and 
notified Anderson of its coming. A demand for surrender was sent to Anderson on the 
11th through Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., and Stephen D. Lee, both aides to General 
Beauregard. Anderson refused but remarked that he would be starved out within a few 
days. Accordingly, Beauregard referred the issue to Secretary of War Walker in 
Montgomery. To this Walker replied, “Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter. 
If Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and 
agree that in the mean time he will not use his guns against us…you are authorized tus 
to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your 
judgment decides to be most practicable.”129 These terms were carried to Anderson soon 
after midnight on April 12. He agreed to “evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th 
instant” and pledged not to fire on South Carolina forces “unless compelled to do so by 
some hostile act against this fort or the flag of my Government.” However, Anderson also 
stated he would only evacuate “should I not receive prior to that time controlling 
instructions from my Government or additional supplies.”130  
These last two words struck a raw nerve and were regarded as unsatisfactory. 
Chesnut informed Anderson “we have the honor to notify you that he [Beauregard] will 
open fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time.”131 At 4:30 am on 
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April 12 the first shot was fired on Fort Sumter from Fort Johnson on James Island. 
Anderson soon surrendered, the people of Charleston celebrated, and Governor Pickens 
used the occasion to reassure his doubters that the situation had required “exact 
calculation, and high science.” When South Carolina was prepared, Pickens added, “I 
was ready to strike the blow for my State and the independence of my country…even if it 
led to blood and ruin. Thank God the day has come- thank God the war is open, and we 
will conquer or perish.”132  
Pickens’s enthusiasm was matched by most South Carolinians, especially the 
press. According to Cauthen, a majority of citizens still did not think war would even 
come. Hammond thought coercion would not occur if as many as two states seceded, let 
alone after seven states had formed a confederacy. Armistead Burt of Abbeville vowed to 
drink all the blood spilt as a result of secession. The Mercury was confident that any 
aggression from the North would only unite the South and make conquest impossible. 
Once the slaveholding states were united together, thought the Mercury, “the South is 
invincible.” It predicted some future hostility at Fort Pickens in Florida and admitted the 
likelihood of a blockade, “But a campaign war- a war of invasion for conquest, by the 
North against the South, we do not expect to see…in our judgment, it will never take 
place.” If the educated leaders of South Carolina thought a war would not occur, 
according to Cauthen, the “masses of the people must have been even less aware of the 
danger of war. Led by public men to believe disunion could be peaceably effected, they 
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seem to have been carried along on a wave of popular excitement without realizing the 
consequences.”133  
Those South Carolinians who did anticipate a war would come surely thought it 
would not last for an extended period of time. In the excitement of those first months of 
war there was little trouble rallying men to military service. After the fall of Fort Sumter, 
President Davis’s call for 8,000 men from South Carolina to serve in the Confederate 
provisional army for twelve months was quickly met. By June 30 Davis was calling on 
the state for an additional 3,000 men to serve for the duration of the war. Although the 
response was somewhat less eager, the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th South Carolina Volunteers 
were organized and mustered into Confederate service for the duration. Most of these 
troops were sent to Virginia in the first year of the war.134 There seems to have been little 
opposition at first to the sending of South Carolina troops out of the state. Pickens cannot 
be charged with a lack of foresight regarding home defense in the first months of the war. 
The same day Davis issued his call for men to serve for the duration, Pickens wrote 
Secretary of War Walker asking if “I may order back immediately some of the regiments 
I have sent to Virginia for the defense of our coast” in the event of a federal attack that 
fall. Pickens understood that South Carolina’s “sea-coast is extensive and quite expos d,” 
but added that if he could only be assured of plenty of arms and ammunition he could 
“defend the country or make it not worth conquering.”135 
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Despite Pickens’s efforts at maintaining home defense, general indignation 
towards the Governor’s leadership mounted throughout 1861 as many of the state’s 
important leaders thought Pickens was mishandling the crisis over Fort Sumter and not 
doing enough to protect the state. As early as January 14 Trescot was writing to Howell 
Cobb complaining of Governor Pickens’s “blunders.”136 Several weeks later Henry 
William Ravenel recorded in his diary, “There is great dissatisfaction prevailing in the 
city at the course of Gov. Pickens.” Ravenel found the governor to be “overbearing, 
haughty & rude.” Moreover, his personality “caused many resignations & has made 
himself so unpopular since his election, that were it not for the critical state of ffairs now 
existing, he would be called to account & perhaps impeached.” Ravenel blamed the 
“Rhett party” for his selection and believed that Pickens “ought never to have been 
elected Governor.”137 William Gilmore Simms described Pickens as an “ass.”  Simms 
believed that “he will drive away from him every decent counselor” because his 
leadership “has caused the most infinite degree of blundering and has offended many.”138 
Even Wade Hampton, who remained somewhat aloof from state politics since he was 
busy fighting the war in Virginia, described Pickens as a “fool.”139 More than anything 
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else, those who were critical of Pickens justified their complaints on his mismanagement 
of the military situation. 
Charges of Pickens favoring the Upstate in regard to military appointments also 
appeared. The Marion Star complained that not only had Pickens neglected the Pee Dee 
section but his appointment of General Bonham was the “crowning act of injustice.” 
Similar expressions were voiced in the M rcury, which complained that the “men who 
made the revolution” were not given fair consideration in appointments.140 More 
important was the criticism directed at Pickens for inadequately preparing coastal 
defenses in the likely event of an attack. Throughout June and July the Mercury 
repeatedly urged “efficient organization and immediate preparation” and described the 
state’s policy as “timid and inefficient.”141 If a major Union assault did occur along the 
South Carolina coast and territory was lost, there could be little doubt as to who would 
shoulder the blame. Clearly, Pickens was in a precarious position.  
By early November of 1861 South Carolina had sent an impressive number of 
men to Virginia. A total of nineteen regiments had been organized with six of them to 
serve for the duration. But danger lurked off the South Carolina coast. As previously 
mentioned the Mercury sounded several warnings over the summer urging the state 
authorities to “turn our eyes from the well-fortified banks of the Potomac to the more 
accessible shores of our own State” and reminded its readers “that in the eyes and 
thoughts of our enemies South Carolina is the very head and front of this rebellion.”142 
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The coast had not entirely been neglected. P.G.T. Beauregard had established plans for
coastal defense in May and ordered the construction of two forts (Walker and 
Beauregard) to guard Port Royal Sound.  Fort Walker had been under construction by 
slave labor on Hilton Head Island throughout the summer and was completed by 
September but its armaments were wholly inadequate. Instead of the seven ten-inch 
Columbiad rifled cannons that were supposed to arm the fort, only one was ever installed. 
The defenders would have make do with old Navy 32 pounders and a handful of smaller 
guns which would, for the most part, prove ineffective.143 
While the Union fleet was gearing up for an attack on Port Royal the Governor 
addressed the General Assembly. His message was not reassuring or encouraging. Rather 
than addressing the pressing military situation he recalled the glories of s cession and 
seemed more concerned with how historians would remember him. Pickens “confidently” 
appealed to the future “with the proud consciousness that posterity will exultingly point 
to every page of history, as tablets on whose marble surface shall be engraved the record 
of our honor unstained, and of our integrity without a blemish.” He went on to inform the 
legislature that many troops had already been called into Confederate servic , but he 
described the present state of South Carolina’s military organization as in “  tate of 
comparative disorganization.” He closed with a plea that must have confused most of the 
sitting members. Pickens urged the legislature to “increase the power and dignity of the 
State, through all her administrative offices,” but also asked the members to “adhere 
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firmly to all the conservative principles of our Constitution.”144 How the two were 
compatible Pickens did not say. Pickens’s speech had no clear message and certainly h  
offered no solutions. Two days later Port Royal fell to the Union fleet under Commodore 
Samuel F. Dupont. 
The battle for Port Royal has been well described by others.145 It suffices to say 
the Confederate forces were no match for the Union fleet that captured the forts quite 
easily. More important than the battle were the consequences resulting from the Union 
victory which had “a catastrophic and immediate effect on slaves and planters alik .”146 
Planters fled inland abandoning their plantations and burned large quantities of cotton. 
Many tried to take their slaves with them but these efforts were for the most part, 
unsuccessful. The slave population was well aware of the situation and was not coaxed 
by their masters into believing their predicament would be worse when the Union army 
came to occupy the region. When one young slave named Sam heard the sound of the big 
guns he thought it was thunder but there was not a cloud in the sky. His mother said to 
him “dat ain’t no t’under, dat Yankee come to gib you Freedom.”  This was typical of 
scenes enacted on nearly every plantation.147 The fall of Port Royal caused serious 
disruptions in the master-slave relationship and created general panic among the white 
population. It also “threw Charleston into a panic comparable to that of Washington after 
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the battle of Manassas.”148 Henry William Ravenel recorded in his journal that there were 
“thousands of rumors of traitors among our people,” and that “the people of Charleston 
are apprehensive of an attack.”149 The Mercury also reported that the capture of Port 
Royal “created great excitement and considerable apprehension” and regretted that the 
“two previous months were wasted in doing nothing for our defense.”150 Preston 
complained to Chesnut about the “miserable confusion, ignorance” and complete 
“inefficiency” of the state government.151 There was a genuine and understandable fear 
among many South Carolinians that they were not only vulnerable to Union forces but 
also that a slave population on the loose constituted a serious internal threat. Something 
needed to be done quickly to calm the civilian population and restore order.  
Accordingly, on November 11 Governor Pickens issued a call for volunteers 
under a resolution of the legislature which had been in session for the purpose of 
choosing presidential electors. Several months earlier the Provisional Confederate 
Congress passed a bill “to provide for local defense and special service.”152 The recruits 
Governor Pickens called for were to serve under the provisions of that bill which required 
mustering into the Confederate service. Unfortunately, the results were disappointing. 
Robert E. Lee, who was now in charge of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, 
had appointed Col. John S. Preston to overlook the recruitment of volunteers for that 
purpose. After receiving a discouraging letter from Preston on December 3, L e reported 
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to Secretary of War Benjamin that “the only transfers made up to this time are four 
companies for twelve-month’s service.” And even for twelve months, the recruiting was 
“very languid.” Governor Pickens also admitted “there is great difficultly in enlisting 
regulars now.”153  
The lack of men volunteering for service was no doubt due to the realization the 
war would last much longer than everyone had thought. That the men who volunteered 
were supposed to serve for the duration did not help matters. The legislature responded to 
the enlistment problem by drastically amending the militia law of 1841. The new law 
made all white males between eighteen and forty-five liable to militia duty and required 
company muster and drill at least once every other week. It also authorized the governor 
to call out any portion of the militia for twelve months service “either in this State or any 
of the Confederate States.”154 The legislature greatly strengthened the potential 
effectiveness of the militia by this act. But before the measure could be put into place, a 
great fire broke out in Charleston burning some 540 acres and 575 private homes. Total 
property losses were estimated between $5 million and $8 million.155  
The realization of a prolonged war, enemy occupation of Port Royal, the fire in 
Charleston, the fear of an imminent attack on that city, the federal blockade off th coast, 
rising prices, scarcity of goods, and the problem of enlisting men for the duration of the 
war constituted a general and immediate emergency in the eyes of many South 
Carolinians. As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, before the convention adjourned 
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the previous April it had resolved to dissolve itself by the first day of January 1862 unless
“public exigencies shall require” it to be reassembled at the discretion of the president. 
Members of the convention were losing patience with both Pickens and the legislature. 
Delegates thought both were moving too slowly to meet the urgent emergency faci g the 
state. President Jamsion indeed thought this was a general emergency and in accordance 
with the power given to him, reassembled that body on the day after Christmas. He 
explained the perils of the state are “far graver” than at the time of the conv ntion’s last 
adjournment. Jamison cited the Union occupation “of the wealthiest and best part of our 
seaboard,” and “a slave population which have come in contact with abolitionism.” He 
expressed concern that a great number of the state’s citizens were servingin the field and 
as a result the next fall elections “might be suffered to go by default” which would leave 
the state “without an organized government.”156 In other words, the current structure of 
state government in relation to the emergency facing the state was flaccid. Jamison might 
have added the general lack of confidence in Governor Pickens and the legislature to 
handle the military crisis as the primary reason for reassembling the conv ntion but 
apparently thought it in the state’s best interest to refrain from saying so. 
To meet the emergency the convention took drastic action. Convinced that 
Governor Pickens and the legislature were inadequate to solve the pressing problems, the 
convention created an extraordinary body to strengthen the efficiency and defese o  the 
state. The creation of an Executive Council by the convention was a radical departure 
from previous political practice. It was created out of desperate circumstance  to bring 
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order and stability to a state that was increasingly experiencing the pangs of war. The 
convention ordinance proclaimed “the Governor shall be assisted” by the Executive 
Council “in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him.” The council would have 
power to declare martial law if required “by the exigency of public affairs” nd to “arrest 
and detain all disloyal or disaffected persons” if they were deemed “inconsiste t with the 
public safety.” Moreover, the council could order and enforce the “disposition of private 
property” for public use with due compensation from the state and “draw money from the 
public Treasury” for “the more efficient execution” of powers given to the body. 
Ordinances were passed to “suspend certain parts of the Constitution” and for 
“strengthening the Executive Department.” The council would consist of the governor, 
lieutenant governor, and three other members chosen by the convention. For all intents 
and purposes, the governor was usurped of power since he was merely a member of the 
council. This was not simply a cabinet of advisors. A quorum consisting of the lieutenant 
governor and two other members of the council could exercise full executive power in th  
governor’s absence. In short, the council was given the power to do “whatever else may 
be required for the defense of the State” for the “more efficient execution of the powers 
hereby confided to them.”157 That the creation of such a body with remarkable powers 
heretofore exercised by the governor and legislature was a vote of no confidence in ither 
to conduct the war can hardly be doubted.  The day after the Executive Council was 
created Mary Chesnut described it as “a bundle of sticks and crutches for old Pickens.”158 
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This convention ordinance is significant because it raised serious questions not 
only about South Carolina’s political culture in the midst of war but challenged more 
fundamental political values South Carolinians held dear during the antebellum era. Was 
centralizing state authority in the hands of five men what the radicals wanted from this 
revolution? Was it what moderates had envisioned when they made the decision to 
support secession in December of 1860? State politicians sitting in the convention of both 
political persuasions had voted for the measure creating the council, the vote being 96 to 
23.159 Perhaps the revolution was going in a direction that neither faction had quite 
imagined. In the turbulent times of December 1861 little opposition was voiced to such 
extraordinary measures. The danger facing the state was so great that constitutional 
objections were swept away amid calls for increasing the effectiveness of the executive 
department. There were some sputtering concerns on constitutional grounds but these 
were minimal and quickly brushed aside.160 Not surprisingly, Governor Pickens sternly 
objected to the creation of a body that essentially replaced him as Commander-in-Chief. 
Pickens thought he owed it to the convention “to say that I seriously think the ordinance 
that you have now passed will, in its practical operation, greatly weaken the Executive as 
created by the Constitution.” Pickens expressed his disapproval of Section Eight which 
required military orders be submitted to a vote of the council. Pickens feared that any 
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“unusual or arbitrary power will create suspicion and jealously” and rightfully worried 
that the council would produce “great imbecility in acting as Commander-in-Chief.”161  
One suspects that limiting Pickens’s authority was the chief objective in crating 
the council in the first place. A general lack of confidence in the leadership of Pickens by 
the end of 1861 reached a crescendo. Desperate times called for desperate measur s. 
George Rable has pointed out the consequence was a resort to desperate politics. State 
politicians had to confront practical and ideological questions about ends and means. It 
was more than a simple conflict between those who advocated a consolidated state and 
those who were unwilling to sacrifice states’ rights to military necessity. Rather, “this 
new debate marked the beginning of a long contest between a politics of national unity 
and a politics of individual, community, and state liberty…To sacrifice liberty in order to 
preserve it: this paradox summed up the Confederate dilemma.”162 The creation of an 
Executive Council, composed of the South Carolina’s most talented men to take charge 
of state affairs, was a response to the trying times.  Genuine alarm engulfed the state and 
there was agreement that something needed to be done. The creation of an Executive 
Council seemed to be a plausible solution. Pickens stated that he would resign if it were 
not for the present state of public affairs. In the interest of harmony he pledged to 
cooperate with the council and would “cheerfully” execute the ordinance “to the 
letter.”163 Whatever personal objections Pickens had to the council, it is doubtful he had 
much to be cheerful about at the beginning of 1862. 
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If there was any question as to who would assume leadership in the council it was 
answered almost immediately. On Chesnut’s motion administrative departments were 
created with Chesnut becoming Chief of the Department of the Military. Chesnut was 
given “all such powers as are necessary” to perform his duties which included 
commanding “all officers and employees in the military organization of the Stat .” All 
appointments to vacancies in the military service of the State “heretofore vested by law in 
the Governor, shall be vested in the Chief of the Military Department.”164 Chesnut, not 
Pickens, would be calling the shots. Lieutenant Governor Harllee and W.H. Gist became 
heads of the Department of Treasury and Finance, and I.W. Hayne Chief of Justice and 
Police. Later in the year a Department of Construction and Manufacture was created with 
Gist as its head. The Executive Council met for the first time on January 9 and proceeded 
with business. Of the five member council, there was a mixture of radical and moderate 
behavior during the sectional crisis. The council was not made up of one faction, and 
perhaps this shows that the revolution was moving in a direction that neither faction had 
anticipated. Although its members could not have known it at the time, the Executive 
Council became “the source of the greatest political controversy in the Civil War history 
of the state.”165  
Why did the council become the source of political controversy? Tentative 
answers will be put forth on the following pages. However, it should be pointed out that 
the council was charged with nothing less than transforming a predominantly rural and 
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agricultural state into one that would be prepared to meet the demands of a prolonged war 
that became bloodier with each passing day. Emory Thomas has argued convincingly that 
in their quest for independence southerners experienced many transformations resulti g 
from the demands of war, and by extension, the demands of the Confederate government. 
The antebellum “southern way of life” was revolutionized by the Confederate experience. 
Thomas explains that “revolutions, even conservative revolutions, contain a dynamic of 
their own. They have a way of getting out of hand and transforming even the institutions 
they were meant to preserve.”166 This certainly was the case with South Carolina. One 
need not look to the Confederate government to find a revolutionary experience. It can be 
found at the state level in the actions taken by the Executive Council. 
Evidence for the above assertion can readily be found in the measures taken by 
the council to improve the sources of supply in the state. The council would transform 
South Carolina into a nascent industrial society. Among the most pressing shortages were 
lead and powder. To procure more lead Chesnut sought the help of Professor John 
LeConte to examine the existing lead mines of the state. LeConte reported that the le d 
mine in Spartanburg was rich in ore and easily workable. Therefore, arrangements were 
made “to place it for a time in the hands of the State.”167 The mine was operated by the 
state with indifferent success until 1863 when it was sold to the Confederacy.168 The 
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council urged private donations of lead. In Georgetown the Episcopal, Methodist, and 
Baptist Churches all gave their church bells to the state. The town bell was also given.169  
The council also experimented with the manufacture of nitre to alleviate the 
powder shortage. Although there were saltpetre caves within the limits of the 
Confederacy, Chesnut reported “their yield was far short of our necessities.” He thought 
there was but one way to supply the deficiency “and that was to produce it ourselves.” 
Five acres of land were leased in Columbia by the state for that purpose. It was hoped and 
expected that within eight to twelve months at least one thousand pounds of powder 
would be produced daily. This would ensure “a sufficient quantity of powder for the 
wants of the State, at all times.” The Charleston C urier thought it was “a business so 
novel in this country, that no one had any proper knowledge of its details.” The Courier 
went on to applaud the experiment that was “driven by necessity” which was “being
conducted on the most extensive scale known in the Confederacy.”170 Mary Chesnut 
believed the experiment to be “a brilliant success” and was happy that “Mr. C is proud of 
it.” 171 
In addition to increasing supplies at home the council sought ways to relieve 
pressure on the state resulting from the federal blockade. W.H. Gist, head of the 
Department of Manufacture and Construction “commenced putting up the necessary 
buildings for a foundry and work shops.” Until those buildings were completed 
“temporary work shops were established in Columbia for repairing arms.” Old flint and 
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steel locks were converted to percussion, bayonets were altered to fit the new guns, and a 
large number of pikes were made. A state armory was established in Greenville which 
“progressed rapidly.” Many of these state-sponsored projects were for the exclusive use 
by South Carolina. Gist considered it “the duty of the State” to “retain the means of 
defense, and not give up to any other power whatever all her military material.” 
According to Gist’s report, his department had spent some $95,212 by August 1862.172  
Other projects were meant to serve the needs of the Confederacy. Vessels, for 
example, were constructed for coastal defense and to bolster the diminutive Confederate 
Navy. The convention passed an ordinance “Further to provide for the Harbor and Coast 
Defenses of the State.” The council was authorized to spend $300,000 “appropriated out 
of any moneys in the Treasury of the State” for the construction or purchase of vessels. 
By October the gunship Chicora was completed and arrangements were made “to build 
two more gun-boats as rapidly as possible.” These vessels were constructed for th  
Confederate Navy on the understanding that the state would be reimbursed by the 
Richmond government, which it was.173 It can be said with relative certainty that South 
Carolina embarked on an extensive program of industrialization and manufacturing 
which was a decisive departure from the emphasis on agriculture during the anteb llum 
era. 
Although the council was primarily concerned with military matters, a social 
revolution of sorts also occurred. The council took action to alleviate civilian distress. 
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The shortage of salt created a serious problem for the civilian population who depended 
on the subsistence for the preservation of meat. A proposition was put forth in the 
Executive Council chamber “to push forward the manufacture of salt.”174  The state aided 
those who were willing to manufacture salt on their own by appropriating $50,000 for a 
loan fund.175 To combat the inflation and speculation of salt the council chastised the 
profiteers of “unrighteous and unconscientious extortion” who were “daily adding to their 
gains by raising their prices upon the necessitous and poor.” A committee was organized 
consisting of Pickens, Hayne, and Gist “to consider and report a tariff of prices for 
provisions and other necessaries of life.” The council threatened that any violation r 
evasion would go “punished.” Although price regulations for salt never went into effect, 
the fact that the council debated the issue at all is remarkable.176  
Some price regulation did occur, as on the selling of medicine to the various 
districts. The price of quinine, for instance was “to be fixed by the Chief of Military.” To 
relieve hunger, small amounts of surplus army beef were distributed to civilians free of 
cost.177 As a food saving measure the council resolved that it was inexpedient “to grant 
any license to distill spirituous liquors from grain,” except to distill exclusively for the 
purpose of making alcohol, “a license for which may or may not be hereafter granted.” 
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Several weeks earlier the council had resolved to “close all grog shops and prohibit the 
sale of all intoxicating drinks in the vicinity of the lines of fortifications.”178  
These measures were strictly enforced by Chief of Justice and Police Hayn . One 
individual from Pickens District was arrested and placed in jail as well as another from 
Union District. Six more persons were later arrested and detained from Pickens District. 
In three separate instances Hayne reported that “bar-rooms have been closed, and the key 
taken by the Policeman.” Hayne also reported other “public bar-rooms at the termini of 
railroads and at railroad stations, have been effectually suppressed.”179 By the end of the 
year the council resolved “that in view of the alarming increase in the price of corn and 
the threatened scarcity of provisions…the permits hitherto granted to distill grain under 
certain restrictions, should be and they are hereby revoked.”180 By shutting down private 
businesses, dictating what could be grown on private property, and arresting citizens for 
distilling liquor, the council was clearly meddling with South Carolina’s history of 
individualism181 and intervening on behalf of the state to increase security and relieve 
civilians from the hardships of war.  
If an industrial revolution occurred along with a social revolution as a result of the 
council’s actions, then surely it can be maintained that a political revolution als  gripped 
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the state. Although increasing industrial output and maintaining order was essential 
business to the council, the council’s most important job was the raising of troops. 
Fortunately for the council this unhappy task was made easier by a resolution of the 
convention which declared “no part of the militia law shall stand in the way” of the 
council to organize and call into service any portion of the militia “in such matter and 
under such regulations as may seem most expedient.”182 Apparently, previous legislation 
passed by the General Assembly did not seem to concern the convention any longer since 
the legislature by this point had ceased to function as the primary law-making body. This 
blanket authority was exercised at once by the convention when on February 2 President 
Davis called on South Carolina to fill her quota of 18,000 troops to serve in the 
Confederate army. Chesnut and Hayne studied the situation, came up “with a scheme of 
action” to fill the vacancies, and obtained the views of the Adjutant General (States 
Rights Gist).183 An appeal written by Chesnut appeared several weeks later urging the 
twelve-month troops in Virginia to re-enlist for the duration and not to leave the field 
with the enemy in sight. He asked the troops not to tarnish “the bright crown which now 
gleams on your brow” by leaving after their enlistment term expired and to record their 
names “on the immortal list” of those who had already resolved to serve “until we shall 
conquer an honorable and glorious peace.”184   
When the response was less than enthusiastic notice was given that volunteers 
would only be accepted until March 20, after which the introduction of a system of state-
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wide conscription would commence. The threat to conscript military-age men across the 
state came in advance of the Confederate national Conscription Act which was not 
introduced until April of 1862. In this case, South Carolina was quicker than the 
Confederate Congress to realize the necessity of conscription. The council also reso ved 
that “no person not now under orders, subject to military duty, in South Carolina, shall be 
permitted to enter Confederate services for a less time than the war.”185 The threat of 
conscription worked well. In the eyes of most military age men it was far more honorable 
to volunteer than be drafted. A flood of volunteers came pouring in and by March 20 the 
council decided to extend the acceptance of volunteers until April 15.186 By April 28, 
Chesnut was reporting some 21,914 men in Confederate service for the duration.187 South 
Carolina had exceeded the Confederate quota by almost 4,000 men. Interestingly, a 
notable feature of the new system was a provision that commissioned officers wer  to be 
appointed by the Executive Council and not elected by the troops. This did harm to the 
tradition of grass-roots democracy and individualism that had long characterized the 
state.188 Nevertheless, the council appeared to be doing its job well and had not exceeded 
the mandate given it by the convention.  
The council was instrumental in assisting Confederate authorities to enforce the 
national Conscription Act, which was passed by the Confederate Congress on April 14, 
1862. President Davis admitted there was “embarrassment from conflict between Stat  
and Confederate legislation,” although he assured the Congress that “entire harmony of 
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purpose” continued to exist between him and the executives of the southern states. He 
asked Congress “that some plain and simple method” be adopted for the enrollment and 
organization of men into Confederate military service by way of a national draft.189 As 
many scholars have noted, this was a significant step away from the traditions of states’ 
rights and individualism characteristic of the antebellum South. The creation of a truly
national army and the draft clearly impinged on the states’ rights doctrine that so many of 
the Confederacy’s founders held dear.190 A central government was dictating to the states 
the method and procedure for mandatory military service. These men might serve 
anywhere in the Confederacy and find themselves far from their home state.  
One might reasonably assume that South Carolina, arguably the state with the 
most zealous regard for states’ rights and certainly the state which had historically 
defended the right of state interposition, would come out strongly against such 
centralized legislation. Yet, the opposite occurred. The Executive Council pledged to 
waive “all objections to the measure and to give it a cheerful and energetic support upon 
the ground of imperious public necessity.”191  The “imperious public necessity” was 
another way of saying that the war was not going well. Large sections of the western 
Confederacy were already under Union occupation not to mention wealthy strips of land
along the South Carolina coast. The decision to waive all objections to a national draft 
was justified because South Carolina politicians were aware that the war could be lost if 
something was not done soon to shore up the shortage of manpower. An editorial in the 
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Mercury entitled “The President and Conscription- Better Late than Never,” thought the 
bill authorizing national conscription “is decidedly a move in the right direction, and 
should long since have been taken.” The M rcury was “glad to see any awakenings to the 
necessities of the country.”192 Necessity, it seems, became the watchword for those 
favoring the measure and growing centralization. But as Thomas has observed, one must 
ask how much erosion a political doctrine can sustain and still be a viable war aim.193 It 
was, perhaps, a testament to South Carolina’s commitment to the “cause” and an 
indication of strong southern nationalism that it accepted these changes and innovatio s. 
Yet, it also demonstrates that South Carolina was willing to give up some aspects of its 
cherished devotion to state authority in its bid for independence and quest for security.  
There was, of course, some opposition. J.W. Reid, a soldier in the Fourth 
Regiment of South Carolina Volunteers, was sure that the conscription bill would pass 
because “Jeff Davis recommended it, and it seems that he is a dictator, and that our
Congress will pass any measure that he recommends.” If Congress could constituti nally 
force soldiers to remain in the army for three years, what could keep it from forcing 
soldiers to remain for ten years wondered Reid. Further, in his view, if the conscription 
bill passed Congress, “all patriotism is dead, and the Confederacy will be dead sooner or 
later.”194 In some cases outright defiance of the council occurred, as happened in the 
fourth division of the militia when a draft of 500 men was called for to defend the 
approaches to Georgetown in 1862. Chesnut reported “with pain” that while there were 
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men in the company “the spirit was wanting.” The draft was eluded by some “who took 
to concealment” while others “stood in open defiance of the law.”  Those who did submit 
to the draft “refused to obey the orders” of General Harllee.  Accordingly, the council 
adopted swift and stern measures to meet the resistance and several of the “recusants 
were seized and put into prison,” while others were summoned “for trial before a Court 
Martial.”195   
To explain this “unhappy and disgraceful state of affairs” Chesnut blamed “some
leading men” who endeavored “to poison the minds of the people by inculcating the idea 
that the authority from which the orders emanated was unconstitutional- that the 
Convention of the people of South Carolina was without lawful existence and without 
power.”196 These men were encouraged, he said, by “noxious pabulum through the 
channels of an uninformed press” and the result was “ignorance, indolence, selfishness” 
and “disappointed ambition” which made “coadjutors of Lincoln and all the hosts of 
abolition myrmidons.”197 Part of the problem was, as Emory Thomas has observed, that 
conscription as practiced by the Confederacy was never what President Davis asked for; 
he had wanted “some plain and simple method” of enlisting men. However, amendments 
to the Conscription Act and the issue of exemption created not a little trouble for 
Confederate and state authorities and confusion and tension between them occurred from 
the outset.198 Nevertheless, the incidents Chesnut referred to were relatively few in 
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number and the council largely succeeded in its task of raising men for Confederate 
service. By the end of August Chesnut reported that there were 42, 973 men in 
Confederate service, which was more than one-seventh of the white population of the 
state.199  
Isolated incidents of opposition to conscription therefore should not be interpreted 
as fleeting willpower, lack of morale, or a determination to secure victory. Nr should 
one assume that massive resistance to the Confederate government occurred as a esult of 
conscription. In fact, one historian has said of South Carolina that “no state officially 
cooperated more fully with the Confederate government. Passionately devoted to state 
rights principles there was nevertheless a disposition, until the very last months of the 
war, temporarily to sacrifice these opinions in the interest of harmony and victory. 
Though questioning the constitutionality of conscription, South Carolina gave to it her 
unprotesting support.” The issue of exemptions, which caused so much trouble in other 
southern states, did not create considerable backlash in South Carolina. Political leaders
in South Carolina exercised state power by insisting on the right to exempt certain
classes, especially overseers, but it cannot be said that conscription and exemption 
created general disillusionment with the Confederate cause.200  
Moreover, by working closely with the Confederate government, the council was 
able to advance the interests of South Carolina. But more often the council served the 
Confederacy by giving local application and authority to many of the policies emanating 
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from the Richmond government. In this way, the Executive Council should be seen as s 
strong expression of Confederate nationalism rather than as a body which hindered t. On 
most issues the council yielded to the will of the Confederate government and the 
concern for internal security superseded objections over state rights. In fact, the ouncil’s 
program for defense “served as a shield for the Confederacy and absorbed much of the 
criticism which the austerity measures of the Confederacy received in other states.”201 A 
system of national conscription, enforced by the Executive Council, did not cause enough 
internal dissention to seriously threaten the war effort or the existence of the cuncil 
itself.  
Such, however, was not the case when the council decided to implement a state-
wide system for impressing slave labor on various projects of defense. Furnishing slave 
labor for coast and harbor defenses proved to be one of the most difficult and volatile 
issues the council had to deal with. During the Fort Sumter crisis and throughout the 
summer of 1861 planters seemed more than willing to lend their slaves to the state for 
defense. By 1862, however, this was no longer the case. Apparently, the legislature of 
1861 had debated the issue in secret session and resolved to authorize the governor to 
employ slaves “either by arrangement with their masters, or by impressment.” Chesnut 
pointed out the 1861 law was “defective in several particulars.” For one, the legislation 
“made no attempt at equalization” nor did it contain any “authority for its promulgation.” 
Chesnut criticized the legislature for its actions and for meeting in secret s ssion, which 
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he considered “a grave error.” He did not mention that the Executive Council also met in 
secret session nearly everyday.202  
The council acted quickly to resolve the labor shortage. On May 5 1862 Governor 
Pickens, with President Davis’s blessing and the approval of the council, exercis d the 
authority given to him by the convention. Pickens proclaimed that “until further orders, 
martial law is hereby established and proclaimed in and over the City of Charleston and 
ten miles on all sides beyond the corporate limits thereof.” At the council’s request 
Pickens also relinquished considerable power to the Confederate authorities. He gave 
“full power and authority” to the Confederate general commanding in South Carolina “t  
impress labor of all kinds for public works and defense, in a manner as full and unlimited 
as if martial law were therein established and proclaimed.”203 The council did not merely 
bow to the will of the Confederate government. It ceded power to the Confederacy 
because the council itself was an extension of the central government an acted as an arm 
of the convention.  
These high-handed measures sparked a storm of protest from the planters in the 
areas affected who argued that impressment of slaves was not evenly divided across the 
state, and in many cases they refused to hand over their labor force to Confederate 
authorities. A steady stream of letters reached the council asking for exemption 
throughout the summer.204 Confederate authorities, in turn, complained that requisitions 
were not being met and that the shortage of labor was becoming critical. Accordingly, on 
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Chesnut’s motion, the council revised the system in late July. The new program adopted 
was a state-wide system of impressment that divided the state into four districts with 
equal slave populations. Each district was to furnish one-third of all slaves liable for road 
duty for one month to Confederate service.205  
As might be expected, protests and letters asking for relief continued to pour in. 
James Henry Hammond, for example, protested that the impressment of one-third of his 
labor force would cost him one-half of his crop.206 More typical of the protests was that 
which appeared in the Mercury on August 22 from Abbeville district. Four specific 
grievances were listed and the protest was signed by four delegates to the convention. A 
plea from the protesters asked if the council might postpone impressment since “the time 
of fodder-pulling is near at hand.” A response from Chesnut was printed that same day 
and addressed all four grievances listed by the protesters. Chesnut replied that the danger 
facing the slaves’ health was far less than the dangers facing the men in th  ra ks. 
Postponement was impracticable since the enemy would not postpone an attack.207 In 
some instances there was a sectional aspect to the attacks upon the council. More often 
than not these came from the Upstate and centered on impressing slaves for coastal labor, 
which the planters in the Upstate said would be dangerously unhealthy. After visiting 
“the upper portion of the State,” editors for the Charleston C urier reported that “the 
people everywhere seem united in opposition to it and its usurpations of power.” It was 
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later said that the convention and council violated “principles” by exercising an 
“unscrupulous disregard of political justice to one part of the State.”208   
The council officially justified the system since it seemed “under the 
circumstances, a necessity.” It was also pointed out by the council that the “same 
necessity which justifies the conscription of the white man, justifies the impressment of 
the negro.” Further, the council claimed the power to impress “is clearly given” under the 
authority of the convention and that the only question which has arisen “was on the 
propriety of its exercise.”209 These plausible justifications did not satisfy the planters who 
continued to express outrage at the council for impressing their private property.  
On the whole, however, there is little evidence that the council abused the 
extraordinary powers given it by the convention. Though arrests were made, those 
arrested were soon released or freed on bond. The declaration of martial law was within 
the limits of power granted to the council and a passport system established in Columbia 
lasted for only a brief period of time. In other words, “the council exercised its power 
with not only considerable energy and wisdom but with restraint as well.”210 
Nevertheless, the legislature would abolish the council in December 1862. An 
examination of what led to the council’s downfall will reveal that opposition originated 
from deeply held political convictions that began long before the council’s creation. They 
involve ideological underpinnings that illustrate South Carolina’s long history of political 
factionalism. 
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Chapter Four 
Sovereignty and the Demise of the Council 
It is tempting to attribute the downfall of the council solely to the measures it 
passed regarding impressment and conscription. This, however, would be a mistake. 
Certainly there was resentment towards the council for these actions and there can be no 
question that the council did ruthless violence to the individualism that South Carolinians 
had long taken pride in, not to mention the unity and harmony so many politicians had 
espoused. Moreover, the burdens imposed by the council came at a time when the 
glorious and heroic visions of war were succumbing to the first manifestations of war
weariness. Compulsory military service, shortages from the blockade, rising prices, 
heavier taxes imposed by the council, a displaced population of slaveholders and slaves 
along the coast and enemy occupation of South Carolina territory, all these things 
disrupted normal economic processes and the antebellum social order. These realities 
understandably brought discontent and a tendency to blame those in authority. Just as 
Pickens was blamed for the setbacks at the end of 1861, the council came to be criticizd 
for the deteriorating state of affairs throughout 1862. But there was something more 
important and complicated behind the resentment of the council. The issue was an 
ideological one which had to do with the theoretical question of the sovereign power of 
the convention.211  
For over thirty years most South Carolinians had accepted Calhoun’s theory that 
sovereignty, illimitable and indivisible in nature, was an attribute of the people of th
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state who exercised this sovereignty through a convention chosen by the people. This 
theory worked well when it was used against what was considered to be a hostile and 
centralized federal government before the Civil War.212 But when it threatened to subject 
the state’s citizenry indefinitely to the rule of the convention and council, the people 
reacted against it. Cries were heard across the state for a return to “co stitutional 
government.” The idea that an all powerful council, unaccountable to the people because 
it was itself the people, broke down when the war jeopardized the normal functioning of 
government.  Political divisions which had long been a part of the state’s history 
reappeared. In short, “the old clash of opinion between secessionists and nationalists over 
state sovereignty and the sovereign convention was heard once again like an ironical echo 
from that earlier, happier day.”213 The factionalism that had created so much political 
tension in the decade before the war now threatened to re-emerge in the midst of war.  
Chesnut, Hayne, and Gist had served South Carolina faithfully long before the secession 
crisis. While their integrity was beyond the shadow of a doubt, now “they suddenly found 
themselves confronting a storm of misrepresentation and abuse probably unparalleled in 
the history of the state.”214 
The first murmurings against the council appeared as early as January 1862, and, 
not coincidently, they occurred in Edgefield, the hometown of Governor Pickens. It was 
rumored that the convention, by creating the council, was intended as a slur upon the 
Governor. If this was true, said the Edgefield A vertiser, it would be “detestable and 
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contemptible, in a sovereign body like this to seek thus cruelly to wound the reputation of 
a patriotic public servant.” More to the point, if this was indeed the purpose in creating 
the council, it was to be “regretted” that the convention “did not cease to exist with the 
close of the previous session.”215 Less than a month after it reassembled, there were 
already calls being made that the convention should have dissolved itself. In some 
instances the criticism directed against the council should have been againstPickens 
himself. For example, it was he who had introduced a resolution for a census of gold and 
silver plate preparatory to impressment for establishing a currency. Popular reaction 
against such a measure was so strong that it was immediately revoked, but it was the
council, not Pickens, who got the criticism. Ironically, in fact, it was this resolution 
offered by Pickens that may have started a general campaign against the council.216  
A mass meeting was held in Edgefield on April 9 where resolutions were passd 
criticizing the convention for creating the council and for continuing its own existence. It 
called upon the Edgefield delegates to the convention to repeal the ordinance that crated 
the council and asked other districts to call similar meetings for that purpose. Later that 
month a petition with over seven hundred names appeared in the Charleston M rcury 
calling on the delegates from St. Philip and St. Michael’s Parishes to dissolve the 
convention and the council so that the state government would return to “the rightful 
operation of the Constitution.”217 Similar meetings were held in the Marion district where 
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“a large and respectable” crowd gathered “for the purpose of dissolving the Executive 
Council” and expressed its hope that the convention would adjourn “sine die.”218 Other 
citizens complained that the council members “receive large salaries” while the “the 
people” were “overwhelmed by taxation and bleeding at every pore.” Charges of thi sort 
were easily made but more common were the constitutional objections. The same citizen 
who complained about the salaries also stated that “The people are united in opposition to 
it. It is universally admitted to be an illegal and unconstitutional oligarchy.”219  
Charges of this nature not only threatened the existence of the council but raised 
fundamental questions about the political culture of South Carolina. As George Rable has 
observed, part of the problem was that “few precedents for limiting the powers of the 
secession conventions existed because antebellum constitutional conventions in the 
Southern states had routinely exceeded their delegated authority.” Moreover, “in a 
republic-as opposed to a democracy based on “tyranny” of mere numbers-there was no 
precedent restricting the authority of a sovereign convention.”220 For the most part, 
objections were made on the ground that the council “usurped legislative powers, never 
designed to be conferred on it.” The council, the Courier complained, seemed to operate 
under the assumption that “We are the State.” Every “attempt to legislate is an 
assumption of authority on the part of the Council.”221 In other words, the charge was 
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made that the council was exercising legislative as well as executive ahority, thereby 
diluting the theory of the separation of powers.  
Meeting in secret session, the council was considered by many to be an arbitrary 
and irresponsible body that threatened the liberties of the people. The editorials in the 
Charleston Courier were relentless in their attacks on the council. It was described as an 
“odious despotism,” a “Lilliputian Lincolnism,” and its members “usurpers and tyrants.” 
Moreover, claims were made that the council was creating “dissension and discord 
among a people hitherto united and harmonious” and it was an unnecessary body since 
“The Executive Council has proved a dead failure.” In short, it was “a snake which ought 
to be both scotched and killed.”222 What accounts for these vicious attacks on the 
council? As indicated earlier, a good bit of the political factionalism that existed in the 
decade before the war had now made its way back into South Carolina politics during the 
war. The factionalism had been reshaped but was essentially what it had been during the 
sectional crisis.  
The factional divisions that occurred as result of the debate over the council’s 
existence were not as clear cut as they had been during the sectional crisis in the years 
leading up to the Civil War. Cooperationists and separate state actionists did not 
disappear but they were less visible, no doubt due to the interest of harmony. Still, one 
can discern lingering factions on the question of the council. The Courier, which had 
been the organ for the National Democrats and cooperationists before the war (and 
denounced by the radicals for its heresy) came out against the council more strongly tha  
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any other newspaper in the state.223 This was not a coincidence. Lashing out at former 
political enemies the Courier proclaimed, “We differ widely from the prevalent opinion 
in this State, as to the character and office of Conventions.” The general opinion in the 
state, said the Courier, is that conventions are the people acting in their highest sovereign 
capacity and are possessed of supreme and absolute power. “We repudiate such a 
doctrine or theory, as slavish and utterly at war with every principle of Republican 
Government.” Instead, the “true theory” of conventions, it wrote, is that they are “not the 
people in the exercise of their highest sovereignty” but rather, “extraordinary delegates” 
who assembled for “extraordinary occasions” to discharge the functions or perform acts 
to which the ordinary departments of governments “are incompetent, inadequate, or 
unsuited.”224 This was a clear denunciation of Calhoun’s theory and a direct attack on the 
radicals who espoused it. 
On July 1 the Courier asked several important questions that struck at the heart of 
South Carolina’s political tradition. “By what right does the Convention assume to 
govern the State? By what right does it undertake to supersede the Chief Executive, 
virtually suspend the Courts, abrogate law, interfere with private rights, issue orders to 
tax collectors, appoint salaried officers, thrust aside, in a word, the whole constitutional 
Government of the State, and erect itself into a despotism, irresponsible and unlimited as 
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to duration or extent of power?”225 Radicals and those defending the council had a ready 
response.  The Mercury replied that “there is a need of all the capacity and activity of the 
State” since the danger facing South Carolina was still immediate and great. In any case, 
it argued, the sovereignty “of the State of South Carolina does n t reside in the 
Legislature; for that branch of government, as well as the Judicial and Executive 
branches, is only an agency of the true sovereign.” Therefore, the “supreme power was 
and is the Convention of the People of South Carolina, whose authority is absolute and 
illimitable, in point of time as well as subject matter.” When the Courier accused the 
Mercury of inconsistency for opposing secret sessions of the Confederate Congress yet 
endorsing them for the Executive Council, the M rcury explained, “There is great 
difference between an Executive Council and a Legislative Congress.” The former was 
“an aid to the Executive” while the latter was “a deliberative legislative body, with a 
constituency directly of the people, and a responsibility to them.” The convention “had a 
right to try to strengthen the Executive Department” and thought “no great harm has been 
done.” The Mercury claimed it had no disposition to get involved in the debate but “when 
the right of the Convention is attacked, and that body is denounced and its immediate 
dissolution demanded, we deem it our business to speak plainly and strongly.”226   
Defenders of the council said the convention could not be guilty of usurpation 
since the people could not usurp power from themselves. Nor was the convention guilty 
of assuming legislative power since it possessed all power. To the charge that the 
convention superseded its authority by encroaching on the executive, convention 
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supporters said it was a necessary measure because of Governor Pickens’s “lamentable 
inertness” and the lack of wisdom displayed by the legislature in 1861. Still, the questions 
raised by the Courier were not easily answered, for as Cauthen explains, “there were 
many shades of opinion as to the exact status and powers of the convention.”227 With so 
many shades of opinion it’s no wonder that Mary Chesnut thought “We are so busy 
fighting each other…Never mind Yankees-until they have exterminated the council.” 228 
That political factionalism and political tension mounted as a result of the issue is evident 
and once the debate started, it “tended of course to reach out to all the old differences.”229 
 The metaphysical arguments over Calhoun’s theory were important, but they 
were too complicated for the average South Carolinian who resented the council. Most 
did not care to question the secession theory put forth by Calhoun nor were they overly 
concerned with fine constitutional points. By the fall of 1862 the people of South 
Carolina were tired of the council and the convention. There was even talk of calling
another convention for the purpose of dissolving the old one. The Mercury warned such 
an act would constitute revolution in the midst of a revolution and the people who made 
the revolution of 1860 would not submit to counter-revolution. One might reasonably ask 
if the actions taken by the council were revolutionary itself. Clearly, an internal 
revolution in state politics had occurred from the convention’s ordinance creating the 
council, which had been justified under the auspice of “imperious public necessity.” Still, 
there seemed to be general agreement that the council and convention must go on the 
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grounds that the council was causing too much internal political division. A convention 
was a representative body which was responsible to the people. It was elected for a single 
purpose, to form or change a government. That had been accomplished with secession 
and the ratification of the Permanent Confederate Constitution. The convention’s duty, 
then, was to meet as soon as possible to end both the council and itself.230  
 This debate over the council seriously exacerbated political divisions in a state 
that prided itself on harmony. There were personal rivalries within the council itself. Less 
than one month after the council’s creation Mary Chesnut already thought it “evident 
there will be no concord among them.”231 Chesnut and Pickens, for example, rarely 
agreed on military strategy. A look at the Executive Council Journal reveals the two men 
disagreeing in the chamber on a weekly basis over war policy and mobilization. Some of 
the personal rivalries among the state’s politicians had begun long before the war. 
Political cliques that were formed before the war reappeared either in support or 
opposition of the council. This was exactly the kind of danger that South Carolina’s 
leading men wanted to avoid. There were many politicians who emphasized the need for 
unity and an end to traditional political divisions and the debate over an Executive 
Council was obviously obstructing this goal. President Jamison, however, made no move 
to call the convention back into session and it was difficult for the anti-council faction to 
get the required twenty signatures to reassemble the convention. By the end of August, 
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however, the twentieth signature had been secured and Jamision was forced to call the 
convention back into session on September 9.232
 When the convention assembled in September the campaign against the council 
was at its height. The newspaper war between the Courier and Mercury had reached a 
crescendo at this point, with each accusing the other of inconsistency.233 When Judge 
Magrath vacated his convention seat, John Phillips was elected to the convention to 
replace the vacancy. Phillips ran on a staunchly anti-convention platform and considered 
it his mandate to bring the convention to a speedy end.234 The convention would come to 
an end, it turned out, but not as quickly as some hoped. The convention closely examined 
the council’s actions over the previous nine months. Pickens promptly made a report to 
the convention. A record book kept by the council along with reports from the heads of 
different departments and all military correspondence was submitted to the cnvention 
for review. Pickens used the opportunity to state that he was “uninformed in regard to the 
entire objects and purposes to be effected by the Convention in creating this Executive 
Council” and therefore was “not responsible for many measures.” Hayne’s report, 
however, contrasted sharply with Pickens’s. He was quick to point out that “Among the 
first measures in assertion of the extraordinary powers conferred, was the proposition 
contemplating the seizure of silver plate for the use of the State, introduced by your 
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Excellency” and he called attention to a plethora of other resolutions offered by Pickens 
which had created resentment in the state.235   
 The various reports was submitted to a committee of twenty-one which 
examined them closely. After careful consideration, Robert W. Barnwell made the final 
report. The committee “discovered nothing in the proceedings of the Governor and 
Council which seems to them to require any special action on the part of the Convention 
in the way of repeal, modification, or animadversion.” The duties of the council, which 
grew “out of the exigencies of public affairs,” were discharged, he noted, with “signal 
diligence, ability, and success…with an exclusive regard to the public welfare.” 
Moreover, the members of the council had, he said, devoted themselves “at great personal
sacrifice” to meet the “extraordinary demands” which the “peculiar conditi  of the 
State” required. After reviewing the reports, the convention was “deeply impressed with 
the conviction that the ordinary powers of the Executive would have been entirely 
inadequate” to meet “the exigencies of the times.”236 This report was adopted by the 
convention without any modifications.  
 Opponents of the council became dismayed by these reports and acted quickly 
to dissolve the convention and council. John Phillips moved to dissolve the convention 
and repeal all measures of the council “except such as the Governor may deem necessary 
to the safety of the State.”  The council’s defenders could easily point out that nearly all 
the measures adopted by the council were necessary to the safety of the state. 
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Nevertheless, several amendments appeared which sparked a short but serious debate. 
Former Governor Richardson, who opposed the continuance of the convention, thought 
the council was placed “too high on the dizzy pinnacle of power” and doubted “if 
Robespierre, Danton, or even Napoleon, ever exercised more supreme power.” At the 
other extreme, Barnwell declared “We are the people, and they are supreme.” He 
wondered “How can the people abuse or transcend the power of the people?” Acting on 
that premise, Barnwell asked the convention not to “quail before the popular clamor, but 
remain at our posts and do our duty to the country, regardless of the consequences.”237  
 Barnwell was not a hot-headed radical politician of the Rhett type. His old age 
and wisdom enjoyed great respect from members of the convention and throughout the 
state. If anything, his statement reveals a deep commitment to Confederate nationalism. 
But even his influence was not enough to keep the convention from dissolving itself. As 
for Rhett himself, he seems to have taken little part in the debate on the council. Instead, 
he was still busy offering resolutions in the convention to amend the Confederate 
Constitution.238 The revolution had not gone according to Rhett’s vision. He remained so 
occupied with denouncing the Confederate government that he never seems to have 
realized that a political revolution had occurred in his own state. The council was a 
decisive departure from the antebellum political order and the structure of state 
government had drastically changed. The executive, which had been so weak for nearly 
all of South Carolina’s history, had become the most powerful entity in the state. But if 
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the revolution did not unfold according to Rhett’s vision, it hardly moved in a direction 
the moderates had anticipated either. As we have seen, the Courier was the fiercest 
opponent of the council and its actions even though it had been the voice of moderation 
during the sectional crisis. The political revolution that occurred once South Carolina 
embarked on its course of independence moved in a direction neither faction had 
foreseen. The debate over the council continued the contest between those who would 
sacrifice individual liberty for the sake of independence and those libertarian dissenters 
who would not yield on principle for the sake of victory. The Executive Council 
controversy is therefore an excellent example of that long-running debate that plagued so 
many Confederate politicians. 
 Many members of the convention accepted the creation of the council as 
justified to meet the emergency of the times, but with the passage of the Confederate 
Conscription Acts they believed the situation had now changed and there was a general 
feeling that the council was less indispensable. The Confederate government was still 
centralizing power but the more important question revolved around what to do with the 
convention. Popular agitation had so distracted the state that dissolving the convention 
seemed to be the only solution.239 Accordingly, it was agreed that “the General Assembly 
shall have authority to review, repeal or modify such proceedings of the Governor and 
Council, or any of them, as to it shall seem proper.” The fate of the council would be left
to the legislature and an amendment offered by Inglis was adopted that specified that the 
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“Convention shall cease and be dissolved” on December 17, exactly two years after it
original organization.240  
 The legislature had not been in session since December of 1861. At its last 
session the legislature had passed “An Act creating a Military Establishment for the State 
of South Carolina, and for other purposes.” Now the legislature would consider the fate 
of the council and its actions would result in the passing of the radicals from power. 
When the convention adjourned on September 17 the elections to the legislature were 
only a few weeks away. Probably the foremost issue of the campaign was the exisenc  of 
the Executive Council but it is difficult to say with precision since the elections received 
very little coverage in the press. Some coverage of the issue did appear however. For 
example, an article in the Charleston Courier entitled “Our Next Legislature-The 
Executive Council” asked South Carolinians “to choose such members for that body as 
would pledge to relieve them from the grievance of the Executive Council by the 
impeachment of that anomalous Dictatorship at the next session of the Legislature.” The 
article went on to stress the importance of the election since the “imbecile and 
vascillating” council had caused a “civil revolution.” Another citizen expressed his hope 
in the Mercury that the next legislature would “dethrone” the council.241  
  Inflammatory articles like these were rare, however. More common of the
newspaper coverage was that of the Edgefield Advertiser, which did not speak to the 
issue of the Executive Council, but instead, advised that “care should be taken that only 
those who can be spared from the army should be elected to legislate for us. We are 
                                                
240 Convention Journal, 798-99. 
241 Charleston Courier, August 6, 1862; Charleston Mercury, October 14, 1862. 
 103
infinitely more in want of Soldiers than Legislators.” The Advertiser pledged to support 
“only those who are legally and physically exempt from military duty.”242 Similar articles 
were printed around the state. In Spartanburg, for instance, William M. Foster wa 
endorsed as a candidate because he “sealed his devotion to his principles, and his 
country’s rights in the battle-field with his blood.” Foster had received a wound at Seven 
Pines “which incapacitates him from further service in the field-but his devotion to the 
cause of freedom is as warm as ever.”243 Patriotic duty and virtue were achieved by 
serving in the military and in most cases this was enough to qualify as a candidate for the 
legislature. One historian has observed that this qualification for office is perhaps an 
indication of the essential nationalism of the people, as Confederate nationalism ws tied 
to military service.244 
 Whatever the exact qualifications were, there can be doubt that the results of the 
election indicated a rejection of the old leadership in that there were many new faces in 
the legislature. William Gilmore Simms wrote to Hammond that there weresom  ninety-
six new members “each eager to fire his pop gun” at the convention and council.245 I  his 
address to the General Assembly in November Governor Pickens criticized the 
convention for its “remarkable experiment” in government. Claiming that “the 
Constitution was grossly and needlessly violated,” he asked that the General Assembly, 
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“as the guardians of the Constitution and Law… restore to the State the regular and 
ordinary Government.”246  
 Pickens need not have worried as several resolutions passed condemning the 
actions of the convention and council. The General Assembly resolved that it felt an 
“unabated respect and affection for our State Constitution,” that it still felt the separation 
of powers “as fundamental and necessary” to the existence of the constitution, tha a y 
attempts to set aside that distinction “should be regarded as mischievous,” and that 
conventions should only be called for important organic changes “and not to conduct the 
Government of the State.” Finally it expressed regret at any measures “which may have 
been adopted by the late Convention at variance with these principles.”247 On December 
18 the General Assembly passed “An Act to Abolish the Executive Council Established 
by the Ordinance of the Convention.” Shortly after this the legislature declared al acts, 
proceedings, resolutions, and orders from the Executive Council “have not and shall not 
have the force and effect of law.”248 With that act, the tumultuous history of the 
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Conclusion 
 Lacy Ford and Manisha Sinha have contributed greatly to our understanding of 
antebellum politics in South Carolina. However, both studies end their analysis when 
South Carolina makes its bid for independence. This leaves a gap in the historical record. 
Very few studies exist that connect the discourse of South Carolina’s antebellum po itical 
culture to the Civil War. Charles Cauthen’s study, published in 1950, remains the most 
comprehensive to this date. Unfortunately, Cauthen did not have the luxury of 
incorporating all the historiography that has appeared since that time on the Confederate 
experience. Because so many historians have debated the internal struggle, chal nges, 
and achievements of the Confederate government, the role of South Carolina politics 
needs to be reevaluated in light of those studies. This is what I have attempted to do here.
 Factional divisions that were so prevalent during the antebellum era did not 
simply vanish once South Carolina decided to secede from the Union. It was, ironically, 
the factional dispute over the proper method and procedure of secession that contributed 
to South Carolina becoming the first state to secede. Once Lincoln was elected President, 
the divisions between cooperationists and separate state actionists temporarily faded 
away because once cooperation was assured with other southern states, the pointbecame 
moot. The leading politicians of South Carolina were well aware of the differences that 
were prevalent before the war and they attempted to bury these differences for the sake of 
unity and harmony. This effort, however, met with limited success. Disagreement 
occurred from the outset over the proper handling of the Charleston forts.  South Carolina 
certainly did not agree over the nature of the revolution they precipitated. 
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 The debates that ensued at Montgomery and in the state convention were 
lengthy and often bitter. Radical politicians like Robert Barnwell Rhett and L urence 
Keitt could not even agree among themselves over what the new nation was supposed to 
be. Obviously there were general agreements that slavery should be constitutially 
protected and that this institution would define the new nation, but there were arguments 
over reopening the African Slave Trade, eliminating the three-fifths clause for purposes 
of representation, and whether the new southern confederacy should allow non-
slaveholding states to join, and their differences caused serious disagreement in th  state 
convention. Most of the radical program was rejected at Montgomery. The South 
Carolina convention agreed that amendments were needed yet they ratified the Permanent 
Confederate Constitution anyway. The radicals apparently knew that war was  likely 
possibility and seemed willing to temporarily relent on their various demands in order t  
be practical, but many were determined to carry their vision of the revolution through to 
its fullest manifestation. They were not able to do this and, for their part, the moderates, 
ever afraid of the risks and quite aware that revolutions can spin out of control, attempted 
to end the revolution quickly for the sake of cooperation with southern states. Yet, an 
internal revolution did occur in South Carolina that the moderates and radicals never 
anticipated.  
 When Francis Pickens was elected governor in 1860 as a compromise candidate 
it seemed a great way to please both factions. At first his election was appluded and 
many citizens in South Carolina thought that he would do a fine job. His personality, 
however, was ill-suited for the task at hand, for he was not a man of decisive action and 
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his handling of the state’s defenses was perceived as inadequate. When Port Royal fell t  
Union forces in November of 1861 there was widespread criticism of his leadership 
across the state. The result was a drastic departure from the existing political structure of 
the state to meet an emergency that many South Carolinians perceived as immediate and 
urgent. The convention therefore was called back into session to find a solution to the 
crisis. The result was the creation of an Executive Council to assist the governor exercise 
his duties. It was clearly a vote of no confidence in Pickens. The council went about its 
work with considerable energy and vigor and succeeded in placing South Carolina on a 
more permanent war-footing and did much to prepare the state for a war that lasted 
longer than anyone foresaw. Although the council’s actions addressed the pressing 
military problems in South Carolina they also created an internal revolution since it  
powers and actions marked a departure from the state’s political traditions.  
 The Executive Council represented a revolutionary experience for South 
Carolinians. The council was, as Mary Chesnut observed, “an exigency of the war.”249 
The state’s long emphasis on agriculture gave way to industrialism. State-sponsored 
projects greatly increased the industrial output of essential war materials. Some of these 
projects were meant to serve the state while others served the Confederacy. The ouncil 
also acted to relieve civilian distress resulting from the blockade and federal occupation 
of large coastal areas. Orders dictating what kind of food could be grown and for what 
purposes impinged upon the individualism that South Carolinians valued so highly during 
the antebellum era. Those who distilled liquor soon found themselves arrested by the 
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police. More fundamentally, the council created a political revolution in the state. For 
during the antebellum era the governorship was largely a ceremonial office and power 
was vested in the legislature which made most of the political decisions and controlled 
state expenditures. The council drastically altered that system by becoming both an 
executive and legislative body.  
  Proponents of the council argued that the convention represented the people in 
their highest sovereign capacity and, therefore, whatever actions the council tok were 
theoretically an expression of the people. Not so said libertarian dissenters. Many of the 
cooperationists who were mostly National Democrats during the sectional crisis came out 
strongly against the council. They rejected the theory that a state convention was 
illimitable in power and duration. To them, the convention was called for the specific 
purpose of taking South Carolina out of the Union. It did not have the power to blur the 
separation of powers and act both as an executive and legislative body. Opponents of the 
council cried out that the state was no longer operating on constitutional principles; the 
legislature, they said, was the true sovereign body of the state. This argument appealed to 
many South Carolinians who could easily relate to the political culture they had known 
for so long and, in the end, the council was abolished because a majority of South 
Carolinians were unwilling to submit indefinitely to the council’s rule.  
 However, there was little evidence in any of the newspapers or personal 
correspondence that indicates a lack of willpower to carry the war through until victory 
and independence was won. Discontent with the council should not therefore be seen as 
fleeting morale in the Palmetto State. South Carolina citizens wanted to win the war, but 
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they wanted to win it under a functioning state constitution. There were limits to how far 
South Carolinians were willing to go in order to secure victory. Many thought that the 
council had done little to improve the state, while others thought the council had 
succeeded in its task of placing South Carolina on a more permanent war footing. The 
real point, regardless of individual perception, was that the entire experiment was clearly 
something novel in the state. Gary Gallagher has said “the time is ripe to consider the 
more complex and fruitful question of why white southerners fought as long as they 
did.”250 I would suggest that one plausible answer can be found in South Carolina’s 
experiment with the Executive Council. If South Carolina politicians had not been willing 
to sacrifice any of their political values then it is quite probable the stat would not have 
been in a position to carry out a protracted war. One reason why South Carolinians fought 
as long as they did was because the Executive Council made it possible to continue 
fighting for the duration. The South Carolina Executive Council should be seen as a 
strong expression of determination and willpower to secure victory. The mere creation 
and existence of the council reveals that South Carolina politicians and citizens were 
willing to temporarily sacrifice some their economic, social, and political culture in order 
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